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CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES: 
INSTITUTIONAL, JUDICIAL, AND SOCIETAL 
INDIFFERENCE TO THE LIVES OF 
INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS 
Nicole B. Godfrey* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has long been said that a society’s worth can be judged by 
taking stock of its prisons.  That is all the truer in this pandemic, 
where inmates everywhere have been rendered vulnerable and 
often powerless to protect themselves from harm.  May we hope 
that our country’s facilities serve as models rather than 
cautionary tales.1 
 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, issued the above-quoted clarion call to protect the lives 
of incarcerated people on May 14, 2020.2  At that point, the 
COVID-19 pandemic had brought American society to a 
standstill for a little more than two months, and it had begun to 
wreak havoc on American prisons nationwide.3  Despite Justice 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  Special 
thanks to Rebecca Aviel, John Bliss, Bernard Chao, Alan Chen, Ian Farrell, César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Sam Kamin, Tamara Kuennen, Margaret Kwoka, Kevin 
Lynch, Viva Moffatt, Govind Persad, and Laura Rovner for their insight on a very early 
version of this Article.  I also want to thank Benjamin Barton, Mira Edmonds, Fanna Gamal, 
Randy Hertz, Zina Makar, and Maneka Sinha for their feedback on an earlier draft of this 
piece presented at the 2020 Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop.  Finally, I want to 
thank Sara Hildebrand, Tamara Kuennen, Jesse Loper, Sarah Matsumoto, and Tania N. 
Valdez for their thoughtful feedback and encouragement as this piece moved into its final 
form.  Additional thanks to the editors of the Arkansas Law Review for their careful 
proofreading and edits.  All errors are my own. 
1. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., statement 
respecting the denial of application to vacate stay).  
2. See id. 
3. Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Rejects Texas Inmates on Covid-19 Prevention (1), 
BLOOMBERG L. (May 14, 2020, 6:00 PM), [https://perma.cc/7CZF-FSCJ] (noting that more 
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Sotomayor’s hopes that the nation’s prisons might avoid 
becoming cautionary tales, the realities of and legal doctrines 
governing the American system of mass incarceration all-but-
insured that American prisons would become a site of mass 
casualty to the COVID-19 pandemic.  This Article explains why. 
Let’s start by looking at how the pandemic impacted one 
prison—Arkansas’s Cummins Unit—among the nation’s 
approximately 2,000.4  Established in 1902, the Cummins Unit is 
an Arkansas prison that sits on nearly 18,000 acres of farmland 
that used to be a cotton plantation.5  Built to incarcerate 1,876 
men, the prison confines 1,950 today.6  The men incarcerated at 
Cummins work in all manner of prison jobs; some work the fields 
in a manner all-too reminiscent of the slaves who worked the 
plantations during the antebellum era.7  More than 100 men living 
in the Cummins Unit go to work each day as part of what is known 
as the “Hoe Squad.”8  Unpaid, these men “pile into an open 
trailer” each morning, sitting side-by-side, “shoulder to shoulder, 
hip to hip” as “a tractor pulls them deep into the prison’s fields” 
where they “pull weeds, dig ditches, and pick cotton, cucumbers, 
 
than 20,000 incarcerated people had been infected and more than 300 had died at that point 
in the pandemic). 
4. HOMER VENTERS, LIFE AND DEATH IN RIKERS ISLAND 9 (2019) (noting that “[t]here 
are currently about 3,000 jails and 2,000 prisons in the United States”). 
5. Molly Minta, Incarcerated, Infected, and Ignored: Inside an Arkansas Prison 
Outbreak, THE NATION (June 17, 2020), [https://perma.cc/L7L9-2D5B].  Like many states 
in the South, Arkansas used the post-Reconstruction era to repurpose its antebellum-era slave 
plantations into prisons that would set the stage for the continued subjugation of Black 
people.  See, e.g., CALEB SMITH, THE PRISON AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 136 (2009) 
(“In the aftermath of Reconstruction and the Civil War amendments, Southern states 
dismantled the old structure and recomposed its elements into a kind of hybrid, the ‘prison 
farm,’ at sites like Angola, Cummins, and Parchman.”). 
6. Minta, supra note 5.  
7. See Rachel Aviv, Punishment by Pandemic, THE NEW YORKER (June 15, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/37EY-X3KT] (describing the unpaid labor of the “Hoe Squad” and the 
patrol provided by the “field riders”).  While today the “field riders” patrol is made up of 
“officers on horseback,” id., Arkansas ran its prisons using a “trusty” system until well into 
the 1960s.  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
313 (1993).  The “trusty” system allowed Arkansas to inexpensively run its prisons by 
granting power to certain “favorite[]” incarcerated people who would be charged with 
overseeing the rest of the incarcerated population.  Id. (“In Cummins prison, in Arkansas, 
for example, there were ‘only 35 free world employees’ for ‘slightly less than 1,000 men.’  
This was a cheap way to run a prison, but hardly enlightened penology.”) (footnote omitted). 
8. Aviv, supra note 7.  
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and watermelons.”9  When one man asked an officer why the men 
working the fields had to use “gardening tools rather than modern 
farming technology,” the prison official told him, “[w]e don’t 
want your brain.  We want your back.”10  After returning from the 
fields or other warehouse jobs, the incarcerated men live in open 
barracks, with beds that are about three feet apart.11  Prison 
officials send them to the chow hall “three to four barracks’ worth 
of men” at a time.12  In short, the men living in the Cummins Unit 
are forced to live and work in extremely close quarters—an 
environment ripe to incubate any highly infectious disease like 
COVID-19.13 
By early-to-mid March 2020, prison officials knew that, 
before long, the coronavirus would enter the Cummins Unit, 
infecting a large swath of the incarcerated population, yet still 
insisted that the Hoe Squad report to work in the crowded trailer 
without any safety precautions.14  As the men living in Cummins 
Unit learned of the COVID-19 pandemic and its risks in late 
March, some refused to report to work.15  In response, the prison 
disciplined them,16 even though by the time of the work strike, 
“Asa Hutchinson, the governor of Arkansas, had asked that 
businesses cease ‘nonessential functions.’”17  Meanwhile, in 
seeming recognition of the coming impact of the pandemic on the 




11. Minta, supra note 5 (describing how one incarcerated person, who is 5’9”, was able 
to touch the beds next to him when laying on his back and extending his arms outward). 
12. Id.  
13. Martin Kaste, Prisons and Jails Worry About Becoming Coronavirus ‘Incubators,’ 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/RHJ5-W3DF]. 
14. Minta, supra note 5.  By late March, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) issued interim guidance meant to assist prison officials seeking to protect 
the health and safety of incarcerated persons, prison staff, and the general public.  See CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON MANAGEMENT OF 
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) IN CORRECTIONAL AND DETENTION FACILITIES 
(Mar. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/86QN-UTAQ].  That interim guidance included a 
direction about the importance of personal hygiene, social distancing, and masks in the 
prevention and management of COVID-19 cases.  Id. at 3, 10. 
15. Aviv, supra note 7 (describing how the group of men assigned to the “Hoe Squad” 
lay down on their beds when officers called their names for work). 
16. Id. (recounting that the “men were disciplined for ‘unexcused absence’—a 
violation that carries a punishment of up to fifteen days in isolation”). 
17. Id. 
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wardens to “prepare a portion/area of [their] punitive isolation 
areas to house inmates effected by the CoronaVirus,”18 and the 
incarcerated people required to work in Cummins’s garment 
factory began to “manufacture masks that would be distributed 
throughout the state’s prison system.”19  
This contradictory behavior on the part of prison officials 
continued even after the first Cummins staff member tested 
positive for the virus on April 1, 2020.20  Despite the positive test, 
prison officials did not administer mass tests to Cummins’s 
incarcerated population, nor did they track “which or how many 
of its employees had tested positive.”21  Even when incarcerated 
people began exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19, the prison 
failed to take steps to limit an outbreak.22  Instead, prison officials 
ignored the complaints of symptomatic people, all but 
guaranteeing the rapid spread of the virus among the incarcerated 
population.23  For example, on April 10, 2020, a man incarcerated 
at Cummins “went to the infirmary with a severe headache and 
other symptoms he feared were signs of Covid-19.”24  After 
informing prison officials that he had a “real bad case of diarrhea” 
and had lost his senses of smell and taste, prison officials gave 
him two Tylenol and sent him back to his crowded barracks.25 
Four days later, as the number of symptomatic prisoners 
increased, Arkansas prison officials finally began mass testing at 
Cummins.26  But even in the face of mass testing, prison officials 
ignored public health guidance on necessary safety precautions to 
limit the spread.  For example, in one barracks, four nurses 
administered forty-six tests without regularly changing their 
gloves.27  Unsurprisingly, then, by April 25, 2020, 826 
 
18. Id. 
19. Minta, supra note 5. 
20. Id. 
21. Id.  
22. Id.  
23. Id. 
24. Minta, supra note 5. 
25. Id.  
26. Id.  
27. Aviv, supra note 7. 
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incarcerated men and 33 staff members tested positive for the 
virus.28  
But prison officials did not inform all prisoners of their 
positive result right away or take steps to quarantine infected 
people.  One person reported that after mass testing in his 
barracks, “a sergeant later shouted into the barracks, ‘Y’all are 
negative.’”29  This person, who noticed he could not smell 
anything when another man “defecated a few feet away from 
him,” remained skeptical and asked a family member to call the 
prison to find out the true results of his test.30  “He was positive.”31 
Despite the mass outbreak at Cummins, incarcerated people, 
former staff members, and current staff members reported a 
shocking level of indifference to the health of those infected.32  
Former staff members confirmed a practice of shredding sick call 
requests rather than responding to them,33 and current staff 
members reported seeing prison grievances in bathroom trash 
cans.34  One former nurse of the Arkansas prison system 
confirmed:  “[t]he mentality of the infirmary is:  these individuals 
are worthless.”35  One incarcerated person, twenty-nine-year-old 
Derick Coley, saw a nurse at Cummins on April 15; the nurse 
“noted that he was too weak to walk and his blood-oxygen level 
was ninety, which would typically indicate that a patient should 
be hospitalized.”36  Rather than send Mr. Coley to the hospital, 
the nurse sent him “to the Hole, where he remained for seventeen 
days.  His vitals were never recorded again.”37  The men confined 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id.  
30. Id.  
31. Id. 
32. Aviv, supra note 7. 
33. Id. 
34. Id.  A grievance is a formal complaint lodged by an incarcerated person related to 
conditions within a carceral facility.  An incarcerated person is required by the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court.  
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).  Exhaustion generally requires the filing of a 
grievance using the prison system’s requirements and following the prison system’s 
procedures through to completion.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (cautioning 
that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion” as defined by 
administrative law). 
35. Aviv, supra note 7. 
36. Id.  
37. Id. 
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next to Mr. Coley in the segregation unit begged staff to take him 
to the infirmary because he couldn’t breathe, but staff members 
just kept walking by his cell, ignoring him.38  When officers 
finally came to his cell—“not to check on him but to clear it so 
that someone else could move in”—Mr. Coley collapsed.39  
Prison officials handcuffed him, placed him in a wheelchair, and 
took him to the infirmary, where he “was ‘worked on and then 
passed away,’” according to the coroner’s report.40  At the time 
of his death, the prison had no doctor on duty, so the infirmary 
staff called the doctor on call, William Patrick Scott, whose 
“medical license ha[d] been suspended three times.”41 
Unfortunately, Mr. Coley’s story is neither unique to him, to 
the Cummins Unit, or to the Arkansas prison system.  By May 3, 
2020, just one month after the first Cummins staff member tested 
positive for COVID-19, four incarcerated people had died of 
COVID-19 complications and nearly half of the incarcerated 
population tested positive for the disease.42  By June 9, 2020, just 
a month later, eleven people had died in the Cummins Unit 
alone,43 and by September 2020, thirty-nine people had died 
throughout the Arkansas prison system.44  By July 1, 2021, 11,425 
people incarcerated in Arkansas prisons had contracted COVID-
19, and fifty-two people had died.45  Across the country, 398,627 
people incarcerated in American prisons have contracted 
COVID-19, and 2,715 people have died.46  
Prisons across the country have faced outbreaks like the 
outbreak at Cummins.  At the Marion Correctional Institution in 
 
38. Id.  
39. Id. 
40. Aviv, supra note 7. 
41. Id.  
42. 4 Cummins Unit Inmates Die Due to COVID-19, 4029 NEWS (May 3, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/TUF8-74JB] (noting the deaths of four incarcerated people at Cummins); 
see also Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 811 (E.D. Ark. 2020) (finding that 856 
people (of the 1,950) in Cummins contracted COVID by April 27, 2020).  
43. Anna Stitt, COVID-19 Inside Arkansas Prisons: The Death of Derick Coley, 
KUAR (June 9, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GBX5-E93Z]. 
44. John Moritz, Virus Deaths at 39 in State’s Prisons; 11 Inmates Were Eligible for 
Parole, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Sept. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HVM6-J5RT]. 
45. A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT, [https://perma.cc/6AK9-RF37], (July 1, 2021, 1:00 PM). 
46. Id. 
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Ohio, more than 80% of the incarcerated population tested 
positive for COVID-19.47  In Wisconsin, nearly 8% of the 
incarcerated population—more than 6,700 people—in the state 
Department of Corrections contracted COVID-19 by November 
2020.48  By June 2021, that number had risen to 10,989 people 
(one in two) in Wisconsin’s prisons, a rate four times greater than 
the rate in Wisconsin overall.49  In all, the COVID-19 case rate 
for incarcerated people reached 5.5 times higher than the national 
case rate in the United States by June 2020.50  Incarcerated people 
have faced a mortality rate that is 45% higher than the overall 
rate.51 
In addition to the illness and death that accompanies an 
outbreak, conditions in prisons that are experiencing an outbreak 
are often abysmal.  For example, at Sterling Correctional Facility 
in Colorado, outbreaks have been accompanied by extensive 
lockdowns, during which incarcerated people are locked down in 
their cells without access to showers or the bathroom.52  At times, 
these lockdowns last seventy-two hours without access to a 
shower and with limited meals.53  Colorado is not alone in 
utilizing lockdowns as a tool to manage the pandemic in its 
prisons.54  Moreover, in those facilities facing rampant infection 
rates, incarcerated people who fall ill are not receiving the care 
 
47. Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of Covid-19, 115 NW. UNIV. L. 
REV. 59, 63 (2020) (noting that health experts warned “that the contagion ha[d] begun to 
spread to the communities surrounding the prison where guards and other staff live”).  
48. Rich Kremer, More Than 8 Percent of State’s Prison Population Currently Infected 
with COVID-19, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/VWD4-UDZ9]. 
49. THE MARSHALL PROJECT, supra note 45.  For comparison, the infection rate for 
the incarcerated population in Arkansas is 5.7 times the rate in Arkansas overall, while the 
rate in Ohio’s prisons is 2.1 times the overall rate for the state.  Id. 
50. Brendan Saloneret et al., COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State 
Prisons, JAMA NETWORK (July 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/FK6M-23ZV]. 
51. Moe Clark, Vaccination Rates in Colorado Prisons Remain Low as COVID-19 
Cases Spike Across the State, COLO. NEWSLINE (Aug. 3, 2021), [https://perma.cc/Q6PT-
29Z2]. 
52. Moe Clark, ‘It Was Just Chaos’: Former Sterling Prison Guard Says COVID 
Protocols Were Not Enforced, COLO. NEWSLINE (Nov. 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6YCF-
BW6C]. 
53. Id.  
54. See Nicole B. Godfrey & Laura L. Rovner, COVID-19 in American Prisons: 
Solitary Confinement is Not the Solution, 2 ARIZ. ST. L.J. ONLINE 127, 135-36 (2020) (noting 
that prison systems are turning to solitary confinement to address the harms posed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic). 
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necessary to adequately treat COVID-19 and its attendant 
comorbidities.55  In short, American prisons have become 
cautionary tales in both their lack of preparation and their 
response to the pandemic, at a cost of thousands of lives and the 
untold suffering of hundreds of thousands of incarcerated people. 
This Article posits that American prisons were doomed to be 
cautionary tales from the start of the pandemic due to three 
interwoven strands of indifference faced by incarcerated people 
in this country.  First, the sheer enormity of the American carceral 
state56 has led to an institutional indifference to the lives of 
incarcerated individuals.  American prisons are crowded, 
unhygienic, and violent.57  Prison officials focus their energy on 
security and control rather than rehabilitation and health.58  While 
the past half century has seen a rapid expansion in incarceration,59 
prison systems have done little to account for “the many ways in 
which incarcerated people face new risks of injury, sickness, and 
death behind bars.  The deaths, injuries, sickness, and trauma 
caused by incarceration” are wholly ignored.60  The COVID-19 
pandemic has brought this institutional indifference to the fore 
 
55. Carlos Franco-Paredes et al., Imprisoned on the COVID-19 Death Row, BMJ 
BLOGS (Nov. 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/RA8D-C9GJ] (noting that once incarcerated people 
become ill, “they are unable to receive adequate and timely medical care”). 
56. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 9 (“There are currently about 3,000 jails and 2,000 
prisons in the United States.”). 
57. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 47, at 73 (noting that “prisons are infamous for 
overcrowding”); Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1579, 1580 (2019) (noting the overcrowding inherent to the American prison system); 
Amanda Klonsky, An Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction 
Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/E8QD-5ESL] (explaining that 
toilet tanks double as sinks “for hand washing, tooth brushing and other hygiene”). 
58. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 6 (warning that “[h]ealth care is not a top priority in 
prison” because “health systems in jail and prison are usually designed and controlled by 
people who aren’t health experts”); see also id. at 2 (noting that prisons and jails “are 
paramilitary settings, where the group that has the health data is usually under the control of 
the security service”). 
59. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1580 (recounting the “familiar” story of the U.S. 
incarceration rate: “The United States incarcerates more people than anyone else in the 
world, both in absolute terms and per capita.  The United States has less than 5% of the 
world’s population but 20% of the world’s prison inmates.  There are 2.1 million people 
behind bars in this country, which is almost one in every 100 adults.  Many prisons are 
overcrowded, at times unconstitutionally so.  Given these facts, it is not surprising that the 
phrase ‘mass incarceration’ is routinely used to describe the American approach to crime and 
punishment.”). 
60. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 3. 
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and highlighted the myriad ways prisons as institutions ignore the 
plight of the incarcerated.  
Second, the muddled Eighth Amendment doctrine applied to 
claims challenging prison conditions61 is the result of 
overwhelming judicial indifference to the lives of the 
incarcerated.  This judicial indifference arises in part from the 
overwhelming deference the judiciary affords to prison officials62 
and in part from a misdirected focus on punishment—and a 
concomitant focus on intent—in cases challenging prison 
conditions.63  By examining the series of cases in which the 
Supreme Court developed the modern Eighth Amendment 
doctrine that is applied in prison conditions cases, I demonstrate 
that the doctrine developed from an undue judicial concern in 
 
61. Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR. L. REV. 151, 153 (2020). 
62. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 140-43. 
63. Id. at 137-40.  Incarcerated people seeking to enjoin ongoing harms posed by prison 
conditions must meet an exacting, two-part test colloquially known as the deliberate 
indifference standard.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).  First, the prisoner must 
demonstrate that the condition being challenged is “sufficiently serious” in order to satisfy 
the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry.  Id. at 834.  A sufficiently serious 
condition is a condition that results in the deprivation of basic human needs, see Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), like “food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and 
reasonable safety.”  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 
(1989) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)).  Incarcerated people need not 
wait for harm to befall them before seeking judicial relief from unsafe prison conditions—
the Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment protects against the risk of 
future harms.  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).  Second, in order to satisfy the 
subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, an incarcerated person must prove that 
the person or entity being sued exhibited deliberate indifference to the serious condition 
being challenged.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.  In other words, an incarcerated plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant being sued knew of the risk posed by the challenged condition but 
disregarded that knowledge by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk.  Id. at 
847. 
In prior work, I have argued that application of this standard is nearly impossible in cases 
seeking injunctive relief.  Godfrey, supra note 61, at 153.  In particular, I argued that the type 
of proof necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference of an entity is unclear, and I 
proposed the courts look to certain categories of proof to demonstrate the entity’s knowledge 
of the risks posed by a challenged condition.  Id. at 186-95.  Here, I seek to build upon this 
prior work by examining how the federal courts arrived at the deliberate indifference 
standard for prison conditions claims.  In so examining, I demonstrate that the standard grew 
out of an undue focus on the word “punishments” in the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and 
unusual punishments clause.  By focusing too much on the word “punishment,” the Court 
ignored the reality that incarceration is the punishment at issue in conditions case.  The only 
true question before the Court in a conditions case is whether the conditions at issue in a 
particular prison are such that incarceration has become an unconstitutional punishment.  
See infra Part II. 
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protecting prison officials at the expense of incarcerated lives.  
The net result of this undue protection of prison officials is that 
courts are willing to leave horrific prison conditions undisturbed 
so as to avoid prison officials’ liability.64 
Finally, the reason that the institutional and judicial 
indifferences described above have been allowed to proliferate is 
a general societal indifference to the lives of the incarcerated.  In 
part, this indifference is just a continuation of the societal 
indifference to the poor and minorities, traditionally disfavored 
groups who are disproportionately entangled in the American 
criminal system.65  But societal indifference to the incarcerated 
also stems from a general attitude that prison should be harsh 
because incarcerated people deserve the cruelty they experience 
in American prison systems.66  Compounding these attitudes, 
American prison systems are notoriously resistant to 
transparency,67 leaving the American public with little idea of 
what really goes on behind prison walls.68  
 
64. See infra Part II. 
65. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1582 (noting that “high levels of imprisonment 
disproportionately affect the poor and minorities” and positing that “criminal justice policies 
. . . are created and enforced because they have this effect—imprisonment as a form of social 
control of disfavored groups.”); see also James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: 
Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 
1063 (1997) (hypothesizing that the “warehouse prison” reflects a “paradigm shift” that 
“changed the target of punishment from the body of the offender to his personhood.  By 
subjecting inmates to coerced and regimented idleness, the warehouse prison signifies that 
offenders are unworthy of activities imparting social value and self-esteem.”). 
66. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1585 (noting that “[p]rison is harsh, but we have taken 
most of the other punishment options (shaming, banishment, corporal) off the table, leaving 
the remaining choices as either being inapplicable in many cases (economic sanctions, 
restorative measures), too expensive (intensive rehabilitation), or not sufficiently harsh to 
satisfy retributive or deterrence goals (community supervision, home confinement, 
community service) . . . many believe that the harshness of incarceration is a feature rather 
than a flaw—the worse the prison conditions, the greater the incentive for people to avoid 
the underlying behavior.”).  
67. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10 (noting that “[t]he resistance to transparency [is the] 
product of [both] the paramilitary nature of the setting [and the] role of litigation in 
improving jail conditions.”). 
68. See generally Shaila Dewan, Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the 
Violence of Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), [https://perma.cc/23AB-FATR] 
(discussing lack of transparency in American prisons); Nicole B. Godfrey, “Inciting a Riot”: 
Silent Sentinels, Group Protests, and Prisoners’ Petition and Associational Rights, 43 
SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (2020) (discussing the importance of hearing the 
voices and stories of those living inside prison walls in discussions of criminal system 
reform); Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax: 
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This Article proceeds in three parts.  First, the Article 
describes the institutional indifference inherent to modern 
American prison systems and how the modern, bureaucratic 
prison state strips incarcerated people of their identities in an 
effort to maintain its indifference.  Part II provides a historical 
overview of the text and purpose of the Eighth Amendment and a 
survey of the cases creating the current Eighth Amendment 
doctrine as applied to prison conditions.  Through this survey, 
Part II demonstrates that the current Eighth Amendment doctrine 
is the result of an undue focus on the subjective intent of prison 
officials rather than the harm experienced by prisoners.  This part 
concludes that this undue focus arises from long-standing judicial 
indifference to incarcerated lives.  Finally, Part III examines how 
both the institutional and judicial indifferences described in Parts 
I and II result from a general societal indifference to the lives of 
the incarcerated.  This Article concludes with a call for reform of 
the American carceral system to overcome the institutional, 
judicial, and societal indifference discussed to create a system that 
is truly just. 
I.  INSTITUTIONAL INDIFFERENCE: THE 
BUREAUCRATIC PRISON STATE 
One of the inherent difficulties in talking about the American 
prison system as an institution is that there is not one American 
carceral system.69  Rather, each state and the federal government 
operate separate systems of incarceration.70  However, there are 
some common features that permeate each of these systems, and 
it is those common features that create the institutional 
indifference that made American prisons ripe for disaster when 
the COVID-19 pandemic began.  
 
Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV. 457, 460-64 (2018) (discussing 
the invisibility of prisons as compared to other aspects of the criminal system); Andrea C. 
Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal Institutions, 
25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 462-66 (2014) (discussing problems inherent to the lack of 
transparency in penal institutions). 
69. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 162-63.  
70. Id. at 163 (discussing the expansion of the federal and state prison systems in the 
late-nineteenth to early-twentieth century).  
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First, many prison systems are overcrowded and have been 
for decades.71  Even those that are not operating at full or greater 
than full capacity, are still crowded, even if not “overly” so.72  
According to the Prison Policy Initiative, “41 states are currently 
operating at 75% of their capacity, with at least nine of those state 
prison systems and the federal Bureau of Prisons are still 
operating at more than 100%.  Only one state—Maine—has a 
current prison population below 50% of their capacity.”73  
Importantly, some prison systems have changed the way they 
calculate their capacity in recent years.74  Rather than report their 
capacity as a measurement of the number of prison beds 
anticipated in the original design of a prison, these systems 
instead report capacity as a measurement of the number of beds 
that “can be squeezed into a facility.”75  But no matter the method 
of measurement, one thing is certain:  most American prisons 
have nowhere near enough space “to allow for adequate social 
distancing or medical isolation and quarantine.”76 
Second, prison systems operate as paramilitary 
bureaucracies where medical care, mental health care, education, 
and housing classifications decisions are made in a manner that 
fails to account for the incarcerated person as an individual.77  The 
prison bureaucratic state allows prison systems to ignore systemic 
problems by attributing tragic outcomes either to incarcerated 
people themselves or “a few bad apples” among the prison staff.78  
In the COVID-19 pandemic, the flaws in this approach are 
obvious when one examines the individual stories of the men and 
 
71. Emily Widra, Since You Asked: Just How Overcrowded Were Prisons before the 
Pandemic, and at This Time of Social Distancing, How Overcrowded Are They Now?, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/MQW5-2FDW] (noting that 
nine states’ and the federal government’s prison systems “were operating at 100% capacity 
or more” before the pandemic).  
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 41 (2015).  
75. Id.  
76. Widra, supra note 71.  
77. See, e.g., VENTERS, supra note 4, at 20 (noting how the “paramilitary nature of 
health care in jails and prisons” leads prison officials to “do [their] best to link the death [of 
an incarcerated person] to a personal failing by the deceased patient or chalk it up to a few 
bad apples when staff abuse or neglect is clearly implicated”); see also infra Section I.B.  
78. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 20. 
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women who have died in prison after being infected with the 
coronavirus.79 
Finally, prison systems operate to strip incarcerated people 
from any sense of individualized identity by creating routinized 
patterns of daily life.80  Endemic to this routinized system is a 
tribalism that further solidifies the only identities that matter as 
prison officials on the one hand and incarcerated people on the 
other.81  This tribalism leads to an institutionalized unwillingness 
to identify and reform systemic failures in order to protect the 
health and safety of individual people who are incarcerated.82 
The following three sections discuss each of these three 
common features of American prisons and how those features 
help create the institutionalized indifference inherent to systems 
of incarceration in this country.  Part I.A. discusses how America 
grew to become the world leader in incarceration, locking up 
more of its citizens than any other nation in the world.  Part I.B. 
then examines the bureaucratic prison state and how prison 
bureaucracy normalizes indifference to serious harms suffered by 
the incarcerated population.  Finally, Part I.C. analyzes how the 
purposeful stripping of identity that occurs in American prisons 
perpetuates the institutional indifference to individual lives. 
 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41 (discussing the death of Mr. Coley at 
Cummins Unit); Mahita Gajanan, Federal Inmate Dies of Coronavirus After Giving Birth 
While on Ventilator, TIME (Apr. 29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/E2UG-DR88] (describing the 
plight of Andrea Circle Bear who died at a federal medical center in Fort Worth, Texas after 
contracting the coronavirus); Jack Rodgers, Texas Geriatric Prison Ravaged by Virus 
Dodges Injunction, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/R746-
TG3Y] (recounting how nineteen incarcerated people died in 116 days in the Pack Unit in 
Texas, including Alvin Norris, who died before prison officials “took any proactive measures 
to suppress Covid-19 infections”); Lance Benzel, Before Dying of COVID-19, Sterling 
Prison Inmate Deprived of Care, Former Resident Says, THE GAZETTE (May 23, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/7RRV-KTC8] (describing how eighty-six-year-old David Grosse had only 
other incarcerated people to care for him in his final days in the prison’s ward for military 
veterans and explaining that prison officials “declined to bring him to the clinic” because he 
did not have a fever, despite that he was soiling himself and not eating). 
80. Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 227 
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1995) (describing modern prisons as places of 
“deadening routine punctuated by bursts of fear and violence” and places of “a relentlessly 
unchanging, grimly gray routine”). 
81. See VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10 (describing tribalism as a universal feature of 
jails where correctional officers and inmates look out for their own). 
82. See id. (describing prison tribalism as creating a system wherein allegiance to a 
particular group supersedes the greater good, particularly in times of conflict or friction). 
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A. Incarceration Nation 
The United States first began to turn to incarceration as its 
primary system of punishment in the decades following the 
American Revolutionary War.83  This new mode of punishment 
derived from a sense that society must separate its deviants in 
order to root out the causes of crime, and most states opened at 
least one penitentiary in the decades leading up to the Civil War.84  
After the Civil War, states sought to design prisons that could 
maximize the number of people confined while saving money on 
administration.85  The results of this focus on maximizing prison 
beds at the lowest possible monetary cost remains visible in 
American prison systems today. 
By the 1930s, most states and the federal government 
operated prisons known colloquially as the “Big Houses” because 
of the sheer number of men confined inside the prison gates.86  
But within a few decades, those Big Houses proved insufficient 
to house the country’s exploding prison population.87  Between 
1970 and 1980, the prison population doubled; between 1981 and 
1995, it doubled again.88  And the population growth continued, 
creating the “story [that] is now sadly familiar.  The United States 
incarcerates more people than anyone else in the world, both in 
absolute terms and per capita.”89  This population growth led to 
severe overcrowding, leading prison officials to begin placing 
two or three people into prison cells built for just one person.90  
While recent years have begun to see a slight decrease in the 
 
83. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 160-61. 
84. See id. 
85. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 
supra note 80, at 170 (explaining that states constructing new penitentiaries were driven “by 
how to confine the largest number of [people] at the lowest possible cost”).  
86. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 163 n.61 (citing Rotman, supra note 85, at 185) (“Big 
Houses were prisons that held, on average, 2,500 men, prisons such as San Quentin in 
California, Sing Sing in New York, Stateville in Illinois, and Jackson in Michigan.”). 
87. Morris, supra note 80, at 236 (noting the crisis of overcrowding that followed the 
population growth in American prisons). 
88. Id. 
89. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1580. 
90. Morris, supra note 80, at 237. 
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prison population,91 many prison systems remain operating at or 
near capacity, as discussed above.92 
The harms associated with the crowded living conditions of 
modern prisons are well-known.93  Crowded conditions lead to 
increased violence, and prison studies confirm that prison 
overcrowding can lead to detrimental impacts for particularly 
vulnerable incarcerated populations (“e.g., those in bad health or 
having severe psychiatric disorders, older people”).94  Crowded 
prisons also have problems providing adequate medical care to 
people behind bars.95  Prison crowding limits the programming 
and educational opportunities available to incarcerated people,96 
and it reduces the availability of visitation for people confined 
behind prison walls.97  The decrease in programming and 
education often occurs despite engorged budgets allegedly 
responsive to the larger prison population.98 
 
91. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1581, 1620 (cataloguing reform efforts undertaken by 
the state and federal governments and the concomitant decrease in prison population and 
crime rate).  While overall incarceration has begun to decrease, “[i]ncarceration of women 
has increased dramatically in recent decades, growing at twice the pace of men’s 
incarceration.”  Andrea James, Ending the Incarceration of Women and Girls, 128 YALE L.J. 
F. 772, 775 (2019).  Many of the harms associated with this increase in incarceration fall 
disproportionately on Black women and children.  Id. at 775-77. 
92. Widra, supra note 71. 
93. Id. 
94. See id.; see also Stéphanie Baggi, et al., Do Overcrowding and Turnover Cause 
Violence in Prisons?, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY (Jan. 24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NWX4-
4BSX]. 
95. Widra, supra note 71; see also Amy Miller, Overcrowding in Nebraska’s Prisons 
is Causing a Medical and Mental Health Care Crisis, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 16, 
2017), [https://perma.cc/T93Z-UGLV] (recounting “inexplicable failures of the most basic 
medical care,” including “a man with epilepsy who has landed in the hospital several times 
because he didn’t receive seizure medication” and a rape victim who reported her rape upon 
entering prison, was given a routine physical exam, but “staff somehow missed the fact she 
was pregnant until she unexpectedly went into labor”). 
96. Widra, supra note 71; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-743, 
BUREAU OF PRISONS: GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, 
STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 19-20 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-12-743] (recounting the 
decrease in programming and educational opportunities, “resulting in waiting lists and 
inmate idleness,” caused by federal prison population growth). 
97. GAO-12-743, supra note 96, at 21 (explaining that Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 
facilities have “visiting space to accommodate the number of inmates that the facility was 
designed to house and a visitor capacity to enable staff to manage the visitation process.  The 
infrastructure of the facility may not support the increase in visitors as a result of the growth 
of the prison population.”). 
98. See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 
128 YALE L.J. F. 791, 793 (2019) (explaining that the “federal prison population increased 
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Thus, prison officials knew of the harms associated with the 
sheer number and close proximity of people living in carceral 
facilities well before the pandemic.  In fact, public health officials 
have known for decades that prisons made for easy “breeding 
grounds for all sorts of communicable diseases.”99  Despite this 
knowledge, prison systems proved ill-equipped to handle the 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the incarcerated 
population.  In September 2020, incarcerated people were 
experiencing an infection rate four times higher than the general 
population and a death rate twice as high.100  The import of these 
statistics, particularly on marginalized communities, can be 
slightly misleading, however, because they fail to account for 
three important facts:  first, Black Americans are twice as likely 
to die from COVID-19.101  Second, Black Americans are 
“incarcerated . . . 5.1 times [more often than] white 
Americans.”102  Finally, “incarcerated individuals are much 
younger, [and] more likely to be male” than non-incarcerated 
individuals.103  
In sum, there can be no doubt that American prisons are 
“COVID-19 hotspots”104 and that the pandemic has been 
devastating to the incarcerated population, particularly Black 
incarcerated men.105  Stuck inside overcrowded facilities, these 
people had no control over whether and when they might be 
exposed to the virus.  Their safety remained in the hands of their 
captors, prison officials who work within the prison bureaucratic 
 
from 24,640 in 1980 to 185,617 in 2017” and that even though the budget “has grown, 
‘crowding out’ other Department of Justice (DOJ) priorities, the federal prison system has 
still largely failed to implement evidence-based rehabilitation programs”). 
99. Widra, supra note 71; see also James Hamblin, Mass Incarceration is Making 
Infectious Diseases Worse, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/7AL6-DKQ9] 
(noting the prevalence of infectious diseases among the incarcerated population—“4 percent 
have HIV, 15 percent have hepatitis C, and 3 percent have active tuberculosis”—and pointing 
to the carceral system as “a primary reason that these diseases can’t be eliminated globally”). 
100. Widra, supra note 71; see also Kevin T. Schnepel, Covid-19 in U.S. State and 
Federal Prisons, NAT’L COMM’N ON COVID-19 & CRIM. JUST., 3 (Dec. 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/F4UM-QDH2]. 
101. Schnepel, supra note 100, at 18. 
102. See Nicole Puglise, Black Americans Incarcerated Five Times More Than White 
People-Report, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/3BAP-A9S5]. 
103. Schnepel, supra note 100, at 7. 
104. Id. at 14. 
105. Id. at 18, 20. 
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state that developed in response to the exploding prison 
population in the latter half of the twentieth century.106  The 
impact that prison bureaucracy has on the lives of incarcerated 
people is the focus of the next section. 
 
B. The Prison Bureaucracy 
 
As the incarcerated population grew, so too did the need for 
people to run the prisons.107  This prison population explosion 
also transformed prison systems into modern bureaucracies, 
replete with overarching “rules and regulations that bind the 
organization[s] together.”108  Many viewed this move toward 
bureaucratization of the carceral state as a good thing, and it is 
hard to argue that prisons should operate without written rules and 
regulations.109  However, the structures of bureaucracy can also 
allow individual officials to skirt responsibility when things run 
amok, thereby allowing harms to individuals subject to the 
bureaucratic state to go unchecked.110 
Before turning to these dangers of bureaucracy, however, it 
is first important to have a basic understanding of features of 
bureaucracies in general and prison bureaucracies in particular.  
Malcom M. Feeley and Van Swearingen have succinctly 
 
106. See Malcom M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the 
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE 
L. REV. 433, 456 (2004) (discussing the growth of the number of prisons and guards in the 
final three decades of the twentieth century). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 456-57.  Civil rights litigation focused on protecting the rights of the 
incarcerated also contributed to the creation of the modern, bureaucratic, penal 
administrative state.  Id. at 455 (explaining that different prison reform efforts “were part of 
a process designed to drag pre- and under-bureaucratic (and at times, feudal) criminal justice 
institutions into the modern administrative world”).  See also Godfrey, supra note 61, at 164-
65 (discussing the beginning of the modern prisoners’ rights litigation movement). 
109. Feely & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 455 (quoting James B. Jacobs, The 
Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-1980, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 458 
(Michael Tonry et al. eds., 1980)) (noting that prison systems in the 1960s and 1970s had 
“no written rules and regulations” but instead used “daily operating procedures . . . passed 
[on] from one generation to the next,” resulting in an “ability of the administration to act as 
it pleased,” ensuring “its almost total dominance of the mates”). 
110. See Dan Luban, et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 2348, 2352 (1992) (discussing the reoccurring epistemological excuse of “I didn’t 
know” that comes naturally “to those who commit wrongs in a bureaucratic setting”).  
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described Max Weber’s summary of the key elements of 
bureaucracy: 
Compared to other forms of organization . . . modern 
bureaucracy is defined by a rationalized set of rules and 
regulations that bind the organization together.  Every office 
is arranged in a clear hierarchy of superordination and 
subordination, with employees subject to a rigid and 
systematic set of policies designed to maintain control and 
discipline when necessary.  Offices within the bureaucracy 
are characterized by their fixed and definite division of 
organizational responsibility, and are staffed by highly 
trained officials who are appointed by merit, have set salaries 
and pensions, secure careers, and duties that are clearly 
separated from their private life.111 
Feeley and Swearingen also aptly summarize Victor 
Thompson’s application of Weber’s ideas to the American 
administrative state and identify several additional characteristics 
of the modern American bureaucracy.112  
In total, this discussion will focus on five characteristics of 
bureaucracies identified by Weber and Thompson and applicable 
to the modern American carceral state.  First, the American 
carceral state has a clearly defined organizational structure with 
clear divisions of power and responsibility.113  Every state prison 
system and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have a hierarchy of 
prison administration.114  At the top of the prison hierarchy is the 
director of the prison system, a position usually appointed by the 
 
111. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 456 (citing MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT 
UND GESELLSCHAFT 650-78, 957, 973 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim 
Fischoff et al. trans., 1968)).  
112. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 456-57 (citing VICTOR A. THOMPSON, 
MODERN ORGANIZATION 10-24 (1961)).  Four of those additional characteristics are 
relevant to this discussion:  (1) routinization of organizational activity, (2) classification of 
persons, (3) slowness to act or to change, and (4) “preoccupation with the monistic ideal—
the system of superior and subordinate relationships in which the superior is the only source 
of legitimate influence upon the subordinate.”  Id. at 457.  The other American characteristics 
of bureaucracy identified by Thompson are factoring the general goal into subgoals, 
formalistic impersonality, and categorization of data.  Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id.; see also Morris, supra note 80, at 226.  
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governor or, in the case of the federal system, by the President.115  
The organizational structure that each system director commands 
varies slightly depending on the size and responsibility of each 
particular system.116  For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
is organized into separate divisions focused on subject matter as 
well as separate geographical regions meant to provide oversight 
and support to the prisons within that region.117  Most state 
systems, in contrast, are organized into divisions based on 
specific subject matter.118 
Below this broad administrative structure sitting atop the 
prison system as a whole are the people responsible for running 
particular prisons, usually known as wardens.119  Wardens are 
responsible for the staff members who actually work in the 
prisons:  the administrative, custodial, and programming staff.120  
The vast majority of prison officials are custodial, or security, 
staff, but the division between those responsible for security and 
those responsible for programming or administration is largely 
farcical.121  Indeed, the most important divisions within the prison 
 
115. Morris, supra note 80, at 226; see also Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (discussing 
the federal prison system’s transition from no central organizing body to a civil service 
system). 
116. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457-58. 
117. See Organizational Structure, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, [https://perma.cc/565P-
8PMR] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021). 
118. See, e.g., Organization Chart, ALA. DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/9LVT-
67VB] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); Attachment L: State Organization Charts, STATE OF 
ALASKA-DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/B7K4-JVWZ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); 
Rehabilitation & Reentry, ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/6FM2-DATL] (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2021); Division of Correction Organizational Chart, ARK. DEP’T OF 
CORRS., [https://perma.cc/5NUR-DBBQ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); Organizational 
Chart, COLO. DEP’T OF CORRS. (Feb. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/6XEQ-6XJC].  
119. Morris, supra note 80, at 226. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 226-27; see also Eric Katz, Federal Prison Employees Fear Staff Shortages 
and Mass Reassignments as COVID-19 Cases Spike, GOV’T EXEC. (Dec. 1, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/TK23-M9Y2] (noting the federal prison system’s practice of 
augmentation, whereby non-custodial staff are “augment[ed]” to perform duties of security 
staff and justifying such practice by pointing to the fact that “all staff are trained as 
correctional officers”).  Prison officials have an overwhelming us vs. them mentality, 
wherein it remains of utmost importance that they remain separate from “the criminal 
element they supervise.”  See Anthony Gangi, Yes, Corrections Officers Are Law 
Enforcement Officers, CORRECTIONS1 (Sept. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/FD4J-WLKU] 
(explaining that in the correctional officers’ view, the lack of acceptance by the broader law 
enforcement community functions as a separation “from their brothers/sisters in blue [that] 
brings them closer to the offenders in their charge”). 
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itself are those created by the prison’s top-down, hierarchical 
structure that is modeled off of paramilitary organizations.122  
Accompanying this structure is an understanding that a 
subordinate staff person’s only legitimate source of direction 
must come from his, her, or their superior.123  This can create 
confusion in prison systems, however, when administrative 
supervisors—e.g., those responsible for running the medical or 
mental health programs—issue orders to security staff related to 
an individual’s treatment.124  This type of confusion can also 
contribute to the tendency to pass the blame when something goes 
wrong for a particular incarcerated individual in a prison facility, 
discussed in more detail below.125 
The second and third characteristics of bureaucratic systems 
that can be seen in the American carceral state are interrelated.  
Second, the American carceral state is theoretically bound by a 
set of rules and regulations.126  Third, these rules and regulation 
are, in theory, used to routinize organizational activity.127  The 
reason I use the terms “theoretically” and “in theory” to describe 
these two characteristics are important.  While it is true that 
almost every corrections system in the country has a codified 
system of rules meant to govern the operation of the system, many 
systems have found ways to “circumvent” the rules and their 
processes by implementing specific practices at their facilities 
that are unique to the specific security and programming concerns 
of a particular facility.128  What this means, practically speaking, 
is that while prison systems can often enact rules and regulations 
that, on their face, are meant to protect the health and safety of 
individuals who are incarcerated, those rules may not always be 
 
122. Marvin Preston, What is “Paramilitary”?, CORRECTIONS.COM (Apr. 26, 2010), 
[https://perma.cc/KA68-AA7Z] (describing the established ranking system in most prison 
systems as including line staff (corrections officers), supervisors (corporals and sergeants), 
and managers (lieutenants, captains, and majors)).  
123. See id. (explaining one corrections officer’s experience in the necessity of 
following orders); see also Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457 (stating prisons 
utilize a hierarchal structure to assign clear duties to subordinates within the organization). 
124. Preston, supra note 122 (noting that “Line Staff” can be confused about the 
necessity of following orders from non-security staff). 
125. See VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10. 
126. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 459. 
127. Id. at 464. 
128. Id. at 460.  
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fully followed at the institutional level.  This problem can be 
compounded by the fluid nature of who is occupying leadership 
positions at any given time.  Because the commissioners or 
directors of prison systems are appointed positions, whomever is 
filing those positions is necessarily influenced by the political 
whim of the current executive.129  This means that a reform-
minded leader may struggle to find buy-in from lower-level staff 
when implementing any changes to the system, or, conversely, a 
reform-minded lower-level staff may not be able to implement 
reforms without buy-in from the current prison administration.130 
Fourth, the American carceral state relies upon the 
classification of incarcerated individuals.131  The federal prison 
system became the first prison system to create a classification 
system for incarcerated people.132  Classification systems allow 
prisons to assign people “to specific institutions, units, and cells 
according to their propensity for violence, length of sentence, 
criminal history, and the like.”133  While in some instances 
classification may afford more protection to incarcerated 
individuals,134 it has also led to the creation of so-called “prison[s] 
of last resort,” where so-called intractable people can be sent 
when the prison system cannot find another place for them.135  
 
129. Morris, supra note 80, at 227 (describing the problem inherent to the “lack of 
continuity in leadership” at the director level). 
130. See, e.g., Michelle Theriault Boots, ‘It was Working’: The Rise (and Fall) of an 
Alaska Prison Reformer, THE CRIME REP. (Mar. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6V42-KJFS] 
(detailing the experience of a prison superintendent in Alaska who had backing to try an 
experimental re-entry unit from one prior commissioner only to have that backing dropped 
upon entry of the new commissioner). 
131. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 463. 
132. Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (noting that the first director of the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons implemented “a number of important improvements,” including developing a 
system that “made classification far more systematic in federal [than] in state facilities”). 
133. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 464.  
134. Id. 
135. Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (describing the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ first 
last-resort prison, Alcatraz). 
In 1934, Alcatraz was awarded this distinction.  Its purpose was to isolate the 
criminal of the “vicious and irredeemable type,” those with no hope of 
rehabilitation.  Prisoners for Alcatraz were selected from other federal prisons 
and were transferred back to other prisons before their release.  Alcatraz 
inmates had virtually no privileges and little contact with the outside world.  
To prevent secret messages, officials never allowed prisoners to receive 
original copies of their mail, only transcribed ones.  In the early years, 
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While these so-called supermax prisons were meant to reduce 
violence in prison systems,136 recent studies have demonstrated 
that these facilities did not reduce misconduct or violence.137  This 
means that tens of thousands of individuals have languished in 
conditions of solitary confinement with little penological 
justification simply as a result of prison systems’ classification 
schemes.138  These classification schemes also prevented swaths 
of incarcerated people from securing release during the pandemic 
because prison systems classified them as high risk.139 
Fifth, the American carceral state is slow to reform.140  
Whether through litigation or legislation, reforms to carceral 
systems are usually incremental, contentious, and remain 
ongoing.141  That means that when faced with a new threat like 
 
conversation among inmates was prohibited except when indispensable.  To 
compensate for these restrictions, Alcatraz had a fairly extensive library with 
many classics, and its food was above the average.  Although the rest of the 
federal system was overcrowded, Alcatraz maintained its original purpose as 
a jail for the worst of the worst, a purpose that resulted in a surplus of beds.  
During the thirty years Alcatraz was in use, it housed a total of only 1,557 
prisoners, with the highest average of daily prisoners occurring in 1937 at 302.  
Because of deterioration of the physical plant, Alcatraz was closed in 1963 and 
was replaced by the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. 
Id. at 167-68.  In the early 1990s, the ADX in Florence, Colorado, replaced Marion as the 
BOP’s prison of last resort.  See Raymond Luc Levasseur, Trouble Coming Every Day: 
ADX—The First Year 1996, in THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND 
CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS 47, 50 (Joy James, ed., 2005) (describing the 
construction of ADX, slated to replace Marion); see also Robertson, supra note 65, at 1023 
n.92 (1997) (describing ADX as “a ‘high tech’ concrete dungeon [that] houses inmates in 
cells that prevent them from having eye contact with other inmates”).  
136. Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate 
Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1341-42 (2003). 
137. Benjamin Steiner & Callie M. Cain, The Relationship Between Inmate 
Misconduct, Institutional Violence, and Administrative Segregation: A Systematic Review of 
the Evidence, in RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE U.S.: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS 165, 179 (2016). 
138. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 130-33 (cataloguing the harms of solitary 
confinement); see also Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary 
Confinement is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 747-49 (2015) 
(discussing the overuse of solitary confinement in American prisons). 
139. Covid-19 Prisoner Releases Too Few, Too Slow, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 
27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5RJE-LK9P]  (explaining that government release orders 
prioritized “low-level offenders,” among others, and excluded many who “could be released 
without risk to public safety”).  
140. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457. 
141. Id. at 465; see also Michelle Chen, The Growing Fight Against Solitary 
Confinement, THE PROGRESSIVE (Jan. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9ZPK-ABPJ] 
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the COVID-19 pandemic, prison systems are slow to find ways to 
respond in a way that will save lives.142 
Overall, these five characteristics of the bureaucracies of the 
American carceral state all too often cause individualized harms 
to the people subject to the whims of those bureaucracies—
incarcerated people—that are not readily attributable to any 
individual prison officials.143  In other words, the bureaucratic 
system itself allows for the “compartmentalization, mutual buck-
passing, and deniability” necessary to allow people operating 
within bureaucracies to stand idly by as real, concrete, serious 
harms befall other human beings.144  These harms can result from 
officials’ mechanical adherence to duty, process, or policy 
without regard for “what the fulfillment of his or her duty might 
entail.”145  In other words, the characteristics of bureaucracy 
inherent to American prison systems—the clearly defined 
organizational structure with specific divisions of power and 
responsibility and specific rules and regulations that govern that 
power and responsibility—result in situations where individual 
bureaucrats feel bound to follow rigid structures and policies 
rather than respond to individualized problems or harms that 
present themselves.146  Thus, the harms that befall people who are 
incarcerated are not always, or even usually, attributable to rogue 
prison officials but rather to the failures of the system itself.  
 
(cataloguing the long fight in several states to curb the use of solitary confinement in the 
prison system). 
142. Covid-19 Prisoner Releases Too Few, Too Slow, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 27, 
2020), [https://perma.cc/5YYE-45WU] (criticizing prison systems worldwide for delaying 
releases, thereby “contributing to preventable suffering and death”). 
143. See Luban, et al., supra note 110, at 2355 (attributing lack of individual 
accountability for organizational harms to the “fragmentation of knowledge and 
responsibility” that occurs in bureaucratic organizations). 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 2354.  The paradigmatic example of the horror that can follow rigid 
adherence to bureaucratic duty is, of course, Nazism:  “perhaps the single most salient 
characteristic of the Nazi crimes was their bureaucratic nature.  They were committed, not 
by a lawless gang of criminals, but by a regularly functioning state bureaucracy executing 
official policies.”  Id.  
146. Cf. id. at 2359 (“The horrors of Nazism are without parallel, but the bureaucratic 
pattern of organizations that fragments the knowledge required for moral decisionmaking is 
common to large institutions throughout contemporary society.”). 
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Take, for example, the death of Mr. Coley in the Cummins 
Unit in Arkansas discussed above.147  A series of systemic 
failures, not wholly attributable to the actions of individual prison 
officials, worked together to cause his death:  the failure of the 
system to set up protocols to protect incarcerated people from the 
virus’s spread, the failure of the system to find ways to treat rather 
than isolate people who contracted the virus, and the failure of 
any number of line staff to check-on Mr. Coley in his isolation 
cell.148  These types of systemic failures are what I call 
institutional indifference:  the ways in which the prison 
bureaucracy allows individual prison officials to claim ignorance 
of the plight of individual incarcerated people by hiding behind 
bureaucratic norms.149 
This institutional indifference is compounded by the prison 
system’s prioritization of “control and security over humanity.”150  
The precedence of security over all else is evident in any number 
of common, modern prison practices, including the prevalence of 
supermax prisons,151 the intrusive and frequent nature of body 
cavity searches,152 the ban on unions of incarcerated workers,153 
and the wide-ranging book, speech, and communications bans 
that deprive incarcerated people of participation in political 
discourse and the marketplace of ideas.154  Because most prison 
 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.  
148. See supra notes 13-31, 36-41 and accompanying text. 
149. Professor Luban and his co-authors call the ability of individual bureaucratic 
officials to claim they did not know about the harms occurring around them the 
“epistemological excuse.”  Luban et al., supra note 110, at 2352.  They “argue (1) that 
bureaucracies function (often by design) to permit their functionaries to truthfully plead the 
excuse ‘I didn’t know!’; (2) that traditional accounts of moral responsibility typically 
recognize this epistemological excuse; and (3) that it is therefore very difficult to find a 
workable account of moral responsibility within bureaucratic institutions.”  Id. 
150. Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite of Prison, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1673 (2019) 
(noting that moderate efforts to reform prisons will always fall short because they do not 
address the “structural and cultural transformation[s]” required to support change). 
151. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 65, at 1017 n.92. 
152. See, e.g., Melvin Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a 
Mutual Accommodation, 1992 BYU 857, 910 (1992) (doubting the veracity that visual body 
cavity searches are only for security and “not also to purposefully demoralize and humiliate 
the inmate”). 
153. See Godfrey, supra note 68, at 1132-35 (describing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab. 
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)).  
154. See generally Evan Bianchi & David Shapiro, Locked Up, Shut Up: Why Speech 
in Prison Matters, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (describing the implications of limiting 
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policies are developed in secret,155 are justified by vague 
references to maintaining a prison’s “social order” when 
exposed,156 and are largely free from judicial review,157 “prison 
officials inevitably err on the side of too little freedom.”158 
In sum, the institution’s prioritization of security over 
humanity solidifies the authoritarian nature of the modern 
American carceral bureaucracy.159  When prison systems limit 
both the speech that may leave a facility and the speech that may 
enter a facility, they are both monopolizing the sources of public 
information about prisons160 and limiting the sources of 
information and knowledge for the people inside.161  The net 
effect of these types of restrictions is to create a system of forced 
idleness in that prison becomes not only a place that physically 
separates incarcerated people from the outside world but also 
removes them from broader societal conversations.162  This latter 
 
the speech of incarcerated people in light of the most common rationales that justify free 
speech—the marketplace of ideas, democracy legitimation, the checking power of free 
speech, and self-fulfillment).  The net effect of prison censorship policies “is that in the 
aggregate, people who are richer, whiter, and not incarcerated, will enjoy greater access to 
the marketplace of ideas than others.”  Id. at 20; see also James Tager, Literature Locked 
Up: How Prison Book Restriction Policies Constitute the Nation’s Largest Book Ban, PEN 
AM. 2, 3-4 (Sept. 2019), [https://perma.cc/D2WL-BW4U]. 
155. Tager, supra note 154, at 1 (noting the lack of “public visibility into how [prison 
censorship] policies are considered, adopted, and implemented”). 
156. Id. at 5. 
157. See infra Section II.B. (discussing judicial deference to prison officials).  The 
“central evil” of this lack of judicial review is the unchecked “administrative discretion 
granted to the poorly trained personnel who deal directly with prisoners.”  Gutterman, supra 
note 152, at 900. 
158. Tager, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. 119 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)). 
159. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 
SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 441, 458 (1999) (noting that prisons, by their very nature, are the 
“places where serious abuses of power and violations of rights are likely to occur”). 
160. Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 22 (“Without prisoners’ speech, public 
information about prisons would come primarily from prison officials themselves.  Speech 
in prisons is especially fragile because limited checks on officials’ behavior increase[s] the 
risk of retaliation.”); see also infra Section III.B. 
161. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 150, at 1673 (noting the importance of education 
to incarcerated people and the view of prison staff that education interferes with their “job”). 
To Sanchez, “college education is to the imprisoned what learning to read and write was to 
the enslaved—it is central to the abolition movement.”  Id. 
162. See Robertson, supra note 65, at 1063 (noting the “paradigm shift” in American 
punishment that “changed the target of punishment from the body of the offender to his 
personhood”).  
1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:43 PM 
390 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
removal signals to incarcerated people that they “are unworthy of 
activities imparting social value and self-esteem,”163 and leads to 
the last feature of institutional indifference I want to discuss:  the 
systematic deprivation of identity inherent to the American 
carceral state. 
C. Stripping Incarcerated People of Identity 
By separating people from society in self-contained mini-
societies (a.k.a., prisons), the United States has already created a 
whole new class of other (a.k.a., the incarcerated).  In so doing, 
American society has added an identity label onto the people it 
locks up, but the more insidious impact of this identity label is 
that it is meant to supersede all other identity labels a person may 
hold.164  It is also meant to be a stigmatic identity,165 an identity 
that makes the dehumanizing features of the prison seem justified 
to those responsible for maintaining the system of 
incarceration.166  In the early days of the American penitentiary 
system, this identity was intricately interrelated with the legal 
concept of “civil death—the legal and ritual processes that 
produced the figure of the prisoner as the living dead.”167  
[C]ivil death reduced the criminal citizen to the condition of 
an abject “other,” the negative image of the citizen-subject.  
The citizen was free; the prisoner was bound and contained.  
The citizen was a transcendent spirit or a reasoning mind; the 
prisoner was an offensive body vulnerable to violence and 
deprivation.  The citizen belonged to the human community; 
the prisoner was a monstrous exile, beyond the pale of 
humanity, without a claim to legal personhood.  Divested of 
rights and exiled from the body politic, he was unprotected, 
 
163. Id.  
164. James, supra note 91, at 774 (explaining how the “criminal legal system threatens 
even one’s identity as a mother”). 
165. Robertson, supra note 65, at 1033 (noting that the “coerced and regimented 
idleness” of the warehouse prison becomes a “‘stigma symbol,’ a sign that represents the 
debased identity of the inmate population”). 
166. See, e.g., PATRICK ELLIOT ALEXANDER, FROM SLAVE SHIP TO SUPERMAX: 
MASS INCARCERATION, PRISONER ABUSE, AND THE NEW NEO-SLAVE NOVEL 112 (2018) 
(describing Mumia Abu-Jamal’s description of the U.S. supermax prototype as 
“dehumanization by design”); see also Smith, supra note 5, at 29 (“Dehumanization, then, is 
no excess or exception; it is the very premise of the American prison.”). 
167. Smith, supra note 5, at 39.  
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infinitely vulnerable and pliable.  He could be whipped or 
gagged, confined to solitude, deprived of food, or subjected 
to whatever other torments prison officials deemed 
necessary either to his correction or to the orderly 
functioning of the institution . . . .  Civil death justified a 
virtually unlimited exploitation and discretionary violence 
against the living entombed.168 
And while the notion of civil death of the incarcerated has 
largely been abandoned as courts began to recognize that 
imprisoned people retained some rights,169 the general attitude 
underlying the concept continues to pervade the institutional 
culture and practices of many American prison systems.170 
Thus, while the theoretical rights of the incarcerated 
expanded in the final decades of the twentieth century, the 
perception of the incarcerated held by institutional actors remains 
largely the same—incarcerated individuals are a mere number 
amidst the thousands of numbers subjected to the social control 
of the state.171  But what gets lost in the institutional bureaucracy 
of the prison is the individual and his, her, or their stories and 
voice.172  
 
168. Id. at 39-40. 
169. See, e.g., Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 3 (“[A]s Justice Thurgood 
Marshall wrote:  ‘When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human 
quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a 
free and open interchange of opinions . . . .’”) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 
428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
170. See, e.g., Laura Rovner, “Everything is at Stake if Norway is Sentenced. In that 
Case, We Have Failed”: Solitary Confinement and the “Hard” Cases in the United States 
and Norway, 1 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 77, 85 (2017) (noting that the practice of solitary 
confinement “violates the sacredness of the human person”); Philip Fornaci et al., Criminal 
Justice in the Courts of Law and Public Opinion, 62 HOW. L.J. 125, 139 (2018) (commenting 
on how the prison system “necessarily and irrevocably leads to the deprivation of the 
humanity of prisoners, guards, and the community”). 
171. See Morris, supra note 80, at 227-28 (describing how he created the “diary of 
prisoner #12345” detailing “one day and one night in the life of a typical prisoner in a typical 
prison adjacent to a typical industrial city”). 
172. Cf. Sanchez, supra note 150, at 1654  (discussing the need for scholars to account 
for the personal stories, narratives, and perspectives of people impacted by prison in order to 
“shed light on the inhumanity that goes on inside of prison, the social problems that lead to 
prison, and the humanity of those impacted by prison”); see also Gutterman, supra note 152, 
at 906 (“Today, as at the beginning, the most serious social consequence of the prison system 
is the disintegration of the human personality of those committed to its confines.”); Colin 
Kaepernick, The Demand for Abolition, MEDIUM (Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HDX8-
6TB9] (“The young men there [on Rikers Island] explained the dehumanizing conditions in 
the prison that range from denial of literature to physical assault.  They have been 
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* * * 
The exploding prison population of the last half-century has 
led to the creation of a bureaucratic carceral state that sacrifices 
the identities of the individuals incarcerated for purported 
institutional security and order.173  By prioritizing institutional 
order over individual welfare, the modern prison bureaucracy 
operates in a state of institutional indifference to the lives of the 
people held captive behind prison walls.174  In times of emergency 
or uncertainty, like the COVID-19 pandemic, this indifference 
inevitably leads to individual harms that are above and beyond 
the anticipated harms attendant to incarceration.175  For people 
like Mr. Coley in Arkansas, who could not seem to fight through 
the bureaucratic maze of the Arkansas Department of Corrections 
to obtain adequate protection and medical care, such institutional 
indifference leads to the ultimate harm:  loss of life.  It is for those 
harms that one might think the judiciary should stand at the ready 
to halt and correct, but for reasons discussed in the next section, 
the legal doctrines protecting the incarcerated ignore those harms 
to protect the institutionalized indifference of prison officials.  
II.  JUDICIAL INDIFFERENCE: JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE AND THE PROHIBITION ON CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS 
Despite the lack of care afforded Mr. Coley and others like 
him confined to the Cummins Unit in Arkansas, a lawsuit filed by 
the Arkansas American Civil Liberties Union, Disability Rights 
Arkansas, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
has been thus far minimally successful.176  In requesting 
 
criminalized and caged, in most cases, for being redlined into economic despair.  Forever 
emblazoned in my memory are the words of one of the young Black men:  ‘You love us 
when no one else does.’  The young brother was seeking love.  He was seeking care.  He was 
seeking a space that valued his life.”). 
173. See supra Part I.  
174. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. 
175. See, e.g., Minta, supra note 5. 
176. Aviv, supra note 7 (noting that the lawsuit argued “that the Arkansas prison 
system had displayed deliberate indifference to prisoners’ welfare”).  While the United States 
District Court for the District of Arkansas denied the plaintiff class’s request for emergency 
preliminary relief, the court later denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, so the case 
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preliminary injunctive relief, advocates pointed to the following 
facts, among others, to request that “the prison system 
immediately take more precautions, including releasing some 
people to home confinement”: 
Cummins has had the tenth-largest coronavirus outbreak in 
the nation—nine hundred and fifty-six people, including 
sixty-five staff members, have tested positive—but the 
Division of Correction has made only minimal steps to 
contain it.  The [incarcerated people] aren’t given access to 
alcohol-based hand sanitizer, even though the medical 
director of infectious diseases for the state’s Department of 
Health has advocated for its use.  “Maybe science will take 
precedence now in current situation,” he wrote, in an e-mail 
to the secretary of the department.  Men are still sleeping in 
open barracks, less than three feet apart.177 
In response to the advocates’ request, the Arkansas attorney 
general “argued that the risks to prisoners were not ‘so great that 
they violate standards of decency,’ nor were they ‘ones that 
today’s society does not tolerate.’”178  United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Arkansas Judge Kristine Baker agreed, 
denying the request for emergency relief and cautioning that 
“federal courts should ‘approach intrusion into the core activities 
of the state’s prison system with caution.’”179  Such a result is not 
surprising when viewed in light of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence governing the constitutionality of 
prison conditions and federal courts’ general policy of deference 
to prison officials. 
The text of the Eighth Amendment is a mere sixteen words:  
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
 
remains ongoing.  See, e.g., Frazier v. Graves, 4:20-cv-00434-KGB, 2021 WL1236990, at 
*18 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2021) (granting in part and denying in part the state defendants’ 
motion to dismiss); Frazier v. Graves, 4:20-cv-00434-KGB, 2021 WL4502150, at *15 (E.D. 
Ark. Sept. 30, 2021) (granting in part and denying in part private medical provider’s motion 
to dismiss). 
177. Id. (“A spokesperson for the Department of Corrections told [the reporter] in an 
e-mail that if [prisoners] in every other bed follow new instructions to sleep with their feet 
in the spot typically occupied by their heads, their faces will be ‘separated by 6 feet from the 
next [prisoner’s] pillow.’”). 
178. Id.  
179. Id. 
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imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”180  The 
Eighth Amendment doctrine governing claims challenging prison 
conditions derives from the last six words of the Amendment:  the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.181  While federal courts 
declined to entertain constitutional claims challenging prison 
conditions for more than a century after the adoption of the Bill 
of Rights,182 the Supreme Court articulated and developed the 
modern doctrine in a series of cases beginning in 1976 and ending 
in 1994.183  Since then, lower courts have struggled to uniformly 
apply the doctrine, and scholars have almost unanimously 
criticized it as illogical, inconsistent, and unjust.184  As I explain 
 
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
181. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (explaining that the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause both places restraints and imposes duties on prison officials).  
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, drawn nearly verbatim from Article Ten of the 
English Bill of Rights, “became part of the American Bill of Rights in 1791.”  COLIN DAYAN, 
THE STORY OF CRUEL & UNUSUAL 6 (2007).  While scholars debate the intention of the 
English parliamentarians in drafting Article Ten, most scholars accept that the American 
Framers intend for the clause to prohibit certain methods of punishment.  See Godfrey, supra 
note 61, at 158-59 (discussing scholarly debate around the intent of the drafters in both 
England and the United States). 
182. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 165 (describing the “hands-off” doctrine that governed 
federal courts’ review of prison conditions). 
183. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (leaving undisturbed district court’s finding that conditions in 
Arkansas’s prisons violated the Eighth Amendment); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 
346-48 (1981) (focusing on objective effects of double-celling to determine that practice did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding, 
in the context of an excessive force case, that “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not 
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause”); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1991) (confirming 
that a two-part test, consisting of objective and subjective components, characterized every 
Eighth Amendment claim); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (upholding the rule 
that “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment”) (internal quotations omitted); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) 
(confirming that Eighth Amendment protects against future harm); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840-
41, 847 (defining deliberate indifference as those instances where a prison official knows of 
a risk of harm attendant to a prison condition but fails to take reasonable steps to abate the 
risk).  
184. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 186 (criticizing the application of the current doctrine 
in cases seeking injunctive relief); Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of 
Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 428-29 (2018) (criticizing the 
Eighth Amendment doctrine’s focus on the subjective intent of prison officials rather than 
the objective harms inflicted on the incarcerated); Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment 
Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405, 
426 (2016) (criticizing Eighth Amendment doctrine for failing to fully account for the 
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below, part of the challenge with the standard is that it developed 
out of a judicial refusal to acknowledge that, in prison conditions 
cases, the punishment at issue is incarceration itself. 
A. Ignoring Incarceration as Punishment 
The Supreme Court first considered how the Eighth 
Amendment might apply to prison conditions claims in the 1976 
case of Estelle v. Gamble.185  Estelle, viewed by many as an 
improvident grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court,186 
established that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ . . . 
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”187  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court identified four types of punishments 
“repugnant to the Eighth Amendment”:  (1) those “incompatible 
with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society;’”188 (2) those “which ‘involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;’”189 (3) those which 
are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime;”190 and 
 
contextual history of punishments utilized in early America); Brittany Glidden, Necessary 
Suffering?: Weighing the Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining What is Cruel 
and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1820-21 (2012) (criticizing the unpredictability 
of application of current Eighth Amendment doctrine); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison 
Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 890 (2009) (criticizing 
Eighth Amendment doctrine’s undue focus on what constitutes punishment rather than what 
is cruel).  John F. Stinneford, in a series of articles, has also criticized current Eighth 
Amendment doctrine for being untethered to the original meaning of the words comprising 
the clause.  See John F. Stinneford, Experimental Punishments, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39, 
48-55 (2019) [hereinafter Stinneford, Experimental Punishments]; John F. Stinneford, The 
Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 502 (2017) [hereinafter Stinneford, 
Original Meaning of Cruel]; John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The 
Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1753-54 (2008) 
[hereinafter Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual]. 
185. 429 U.S. 97, 102-04.  
186. See, e.g., id. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing puzzlement at the Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari); Schlanger, supra note 183, at 369 (noting that Estelle “was quite 
a low-profile case—no amicus briefs were filed, and the New York Times described the 
majority opinion as ‘generally stat[ing] the law as it has been developing in the lower Federal 
courts’”) (quoting Lesley Oelsner, Prison Medical Care Assayed by Justices, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 1, 1976), [https://perma.cc/3HSR-5BJ4]). 
187. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
188. Id. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
189. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).  
190. Id. at 103 n.7 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).  
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(4) those which transgress the “substantive limits on what can be 
made criminal and punished.”191  The Court determined that 
Estelle did not involve the last two types of punishment and 
therefore focused its inquiry on the first two.192  Turning to the 
first two types of punishment, the Court determined that when the 
government is punishing someone by incarceration, it must 
provide medical care to that person because failing to do so will 
result in, at worst, “physical ‘torture or a lingering death’” or, at 
best, “pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any 
penological purpose.”193 
Importantly, the Court appeared to recognize that the 
“punishment” at issue in Estelle was incarceration itself, and the 
question posed to the Court was whether the pro se prisoner’s 
allegations of inadequate medical care were cruel and unusual 
such that the punishment became unconstitutional.194  However, 
this recognition becomes muddled by the Court’s decision to 
reassure prison officials that not “every claim by a prisoner that 
he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.”195  To make this reassurance, the 
Court analogized the inadvertent failure to provide adequate 
medical care to the circumstances at issue in Louisiana ex rel. 
Francis v. Resweber.196  In Resweber, Louisiana had sentenced 
Willie Francis, a Black man, to death, but a mechanical 
malfunction “thwarted” the State’s first attempt to electrocute 
him.197  Mr. Francis “petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that 
a second attempt to execute him would be unconstitutionally 
cruel,”198 and the Court denied Mr. Francis’s petition, reasoning 
that because the failure of the first attempt was an “unforeseeable 
accident,”199 trying again did not amount to cruel and unusual 
 
191. Id. (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)). 
192. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 n.7. 
193. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (first quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); 
and then citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83).  
194. Id. at 103, 106. 
195. Id. at 105.  
196. Id. at 105-06 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464, 
470 (1947)).  
197. DAYAN, supra note 181, at 27; see also Estelle, 428 U.S. at 105.  
198. DAYAN, supra note 181, at 27. 
199. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.  
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punishment even though “it [might] produce added anguish.”200  
Similarly, according to the Court, an act of mere negligence with 
regard to medical care could not be cruel and unusual under the 
Constitution.201  
Presciently, Justice Stevens, in dissent, predicted that the 
Estelle majority’s focus on “the accidental character of the first 
unsuccessful attempt to electrocute the prisoner in” Resweber, 
and “its repeated references to ‘deliberate indifference’ and the 
‘intentional’ denial of adequate medical care” would attach 
unwarranted significance to the “subjective motivation of the 
defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel and 
unusual punishment has been inflicted.”202  While Justice Stevens 
hinted that the remedies available against a particular defendant 
might depend on his subjective intent, he insisted that the question 
of “whether the constitutional standard has been violated should 
turn on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation 
of the individual who inflicted it.”203  Referencing a prisoner-of-
war camp from the civil war, Justice Stevens pointed out: 
“[w]hether the conditions in Andersonville were the product of 
design, negligence, or mere poverty, they were cruel and 
inhuman.”204 
Two years after Estelle, in 1978, the Supreme Court again 
considered a case involving an Eighth Amendment challenge to 
prison conditions.205  Hutto v. Finney arose from a series of cases 
challenging the conditions of the Arkansas prison system—
including the Cummins Unit discussed above206—during the 
1960s.207  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the 
 
200. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.  
201. Id. at 106. 
202. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 116-17. 
205. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).  
206. See supra notes 5-46 and accompanying text.   
207. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 680 n.2 (noting that the case at issue in Hutto began as Holt v. 
Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Ark. 1969) [hereinafter Holt I], a sequel to Talley v. Stephens, 
247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) and Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 
1967), vacated 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968)).  Judge Jesse Smith Henley, the Chief Judge of 
Eastern District of Arkansas when the cases began in 1965, handled all these cases, even by 
special designation after his appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit in 1975.  Id.  
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
had issued a series of remedial orders meant to correct the 
unconstitutional conditions it characterized as creating “a dark 
and evil world completely alien to the free world.”208  While the 
Supreme Court’s inquiry focused on the propriety of two aspects 
of the relief ordered by the district court,209 the district court’s 
orders rested on a finding that the conditions in Arkansas’s 
prisons violated the Eighth Amendment.210  In reaching its 
decision on the remedial issues before it, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that “[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is 
a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth 
Amendment standards.”211  Again, then, the Court implicitly 
acknowledged that the punishment examined by the district court 
was incarceration, and the district court found that the conditions 
of that incarceration rendered the punishment of imprisonment 
cruel and unusual.212 
Because Hutto presented an issue related only to remedy, the 
Supreme Court did not directly consider the question of when 
prison conditions render the punishment of incarceration 
unconstitutional until the 1981 case of Rhodes v. Chapman.213  
 
208. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 
1970) [hereinafter Holt II]).  
209. Id. at 680-81.  
210. Id. at 681-83. 
211. Id. at 685.  
212. Id.; see also Holt II, 309 F. Supp. at 372-73.  Indeed, the district court’s conception 
of the Eighth Amendment supports this conclusion: 
It appears to the Court, however, that the concept of “cruel and unusual 
punishment” is not limited to instances in which a particular [person] is 
subjected to a punishment directed at him as an individual.  In the Court’s 
estimation confinement itself within a given institution may amount to a cruel 
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution where the confinement 
is characterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the 
conscience of reasonably civilized people even though a particular [person] 
may never personally be subject to any disciplinary action.  To put it another 
way, while confinement, even at hard labor and without compensation, is not 
considered to be necessarily a cruel and unusual punishment it may be so in 
certain circumstances and by reason of the conditions of the confinement.  
Holt II, 309 F. Supp. 372-73.  Thus, the question considered by the district court involved 
not whether the challenged conditions amounted to punishment but rather whether the 
conditions could be understood as cruel and unusual such that the punishment of 
incarceration became unconstitutional.  
213. 452 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1981) (noting the case presented the first time the Court 
would consider “the limitation that the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States 
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Relying on Hutto, the Court reiterated that incarceration “is a 
form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth 
Amendment standards,”214 and it defined the dispute at issue as a 
question of whether “the conditions of confinement at a particular 
prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment.”215  Drawing on 
Eighth Amendment standards articulated in other contexts, the 
Court reiterated that federal courts must rely on “objective 
indicia” when determining whether a particular punishment is 
cruel and unusual.216  Underscoring the “flexible and dynamic”217 
nature of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, the Court maintained 
that no “static ‘test’” could be applied to “determine whether 
conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual.”218  Reiterating 
the four types of punishment identified in Estelle as violative of 
the Eighth Amendment,219 the Court held that “[c]onditions [that] 
. . . deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure[s] of life’s 
necessities” violate the Eighth Amendment.220 
Applying this new rule to the case before it, the Court 
examined whether the system of double-celling utilized by the 
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility created cruel and unusual 
conditions of confinement.221  To make this determination, the 
Court examined whether the “double celling made necessary by 
the unanticipated increase in prison population” led to 
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” (i.e., 
the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities).222  The Court 
concluded that the findings of fact articulated by the district court 
amounted to no such deprivations.223  The Court then went on, 
however, to recognize that the practice of double celling did 
 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . imposes upon the conditions in which a State may 
confine those convicted of crimes”) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). 
214. Id. at 345 (emphasis added) (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 346-47 (first citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976); and then 
citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
217. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171). 
218. Id. at 346 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
219. Id. at 346 n.12; see also supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
220. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. 
221. Id. at 339-40, 347-48. 
222. Id. at 348.  The Court also included safety among its list of life’s necessities.  Id. 
at 364 (noting the lack of increased violence). 
223. Id. at 348. 
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deprive incarcerated people of job and educational 
opportunities.224  The Court concluded that such deprivations, 
however, did “not inflict pain, much less unnecessary and wanton 
pain.”225  Seemingly, then, the deprivations could not be deemed 
cruel and unusual.  Rather than draw this conclusion, though, the 
Court instead concluded that “deprivations of this kind simply are 
not punishments.”226  This conclusion muddled the issue 
presented to the Court, which focused on whether the conditions 
at issue were cruel and unusual,227 not whether the conditions 
amounted to a punishment above and beyond the punishment of 
incarceration itself.  This type of confusion—as to whether the 
issue presented in cases challenging prison conditions involves a 
question of what is cruel and unusual versus what is 
punishment—continued to shape Eighth Amendment doctrine 
over the course of the next decade and muddles the current 
doctrine’s application today.228 
 
224. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. 
225. Id.  
226. Id. (emphasis added). 
227. Id. at 345. 
228. See generally id.  Importantly, the concurring and dissenting opinions in Rhodes 
cautioned that the majority opinion may be read “as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny 
of prison conditions.”  Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353, (Brennan, J., concurring).  Justice Brennan, 
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, reiterated the importance of judicial intervention 
to correct unlawful prison conditions in order to ensure “constitutional dictates—not to 
mention considerations of basic humanity—are to be observed in the prisons.”  Id. at 354.  
Acknowledging the pressing problems posed by “[o]vercrowding and cramped living 
conditions,” id. at 356, and the “[p]ublic apathy [toward] and [] political powerlessness of 
inmates,” id. at 358, Justice Brennan noted the important role judicial intervention plays in 
remedying, albeit slowly, unconstitutional conditions of confinement.  Id. at 359.  Justice 
Brennan also recognized the federal courts’ role “[i]n determining when prison conditions 
pass beyond legitimate punishment and become cruel and unusual.”  Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 
364 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  To fulfill that role, Justice Brennan 
suggested that the focus of the Court’s inquiry should be on the conditions’ “effect upon the 
imprisoned.”  Id. (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)).  To 
Justice Brennan, “[w]hen the ‘cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens 
the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a 
probability of recidivism and future incarceration,’” the conditions at issue violate the 
Constitution.  Id. (quoting Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 323).  Finding that the evidence 
considered by the district court failed to demonstrate serious harm to the prisoners confined 
to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, Justice Brennan ultimately concurred in the 
judgment of the Court.  Id. at 368.  Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence to caution 
against the adoption of “a policy of general deference” to prison administrators.  Id. at 369 
(Blackmun, J., concurring).  Finally, Justice Marshall, in dissent, cautioned that the majority 
decision may “eviscerate the federal courts’ traditional role of preventing a State from 
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The next Supreme Court decision to consider the Eighth 
Amendment’s application in the prison setting further 
compounded the confusion inherent in the majority’s decision in 
Rhodes.  In the 1986 Whitley v. Albers case, the Court considered 
what standard governs a prisoner’s claim that a prison official 
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment through the use of 
excessive force.229  While the Whitley Court acknowledged that 
prior Eighth Amendment precedent refused to require “[a]n 
express intent to inflict  unnecessary pain” to find a constitutional 
violation,230 the Court ultimately deviated from this maxim when 
it articulated the excessive force standard.231  Citing Ingraham v. 
Wright232 for the proposition that “[n]ot every governmental 
action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject 
to Eighth Amendment scrutiny,”233 the Court once again 
conflated the inquiry into what the punishment being challenged 
is with the inquiry into whether that punishment is cruel and 
 
imposing cruel and unusual punishment through its conditions of confinement.”  Rhodes, 
452 U.S. at 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Finding that the district court and court of appeals 
had faithfully discharged their roles in redressing deplorable conditions, Justice Marshall 
would have left the injunction entered by the district court requiring single-celling 
undisturbed.  Id. at 377. 
229. 475 U.S. 312, 314 (1986).  Justice O’Connor, who wrote the five to four majority 
opinion, framed the question presented to the Court a little differently:  “[t]his case requires 
us to decide what standard governs a prison inmate’s claim that prison officials subjected 
him to cruel and unusual punishment by shooting him during the course of their attempt to 
quell a prison riot.”  Id. at 314.  The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices 
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, took issue with this framing, and accused the majority of 
conflating questions of fact that “are likely to be hotly contested” with the choice of a legal 
standard.  Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  “It is inappropriate, to say the least, to 
condition the choice of a legal standard, the purpose of which is to determine whether to send 
a constitutional claim to the jury, upon the court’s resolution of factual disputes that in many 
cases should themselves be resolved by the jury.”  Id.  Despite the dissent’s narrow view of 
the question decided by the Whitley majority, lower federal courts have since uniformly 
applied Whitley’s “malicious[] and sadistic[]” standard to cases involving the use of 
excessive force by prison officials.  See, e.g.,  Kapfhammer v. Boyd, 5 F. Supp. 2d 689, 692-
93 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Estrada v. Smart, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1275-76 (D. Colo. 2021); 
Gwathney v. Warren, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2013). 
230. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 
231. Id. at 319, 327.  
232. 430 U.S. 651, 653-54, 683 (1977) (involving a challenge to the use of corporal 
punishment at a junior high school in which the Court concluded that such a challenge could 
not fall under the purview of the Eighth Amendment); see generally Raff Donelson, Who 
Are the Punishers?, 86 UMKC L. REV. 259 (2017). 
233. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 
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unusual.234  In Whitley, the Court articulated that the Eighth 
Amendment standard in cases challenging the use of force 
involves the question of “whether [the] force was applied in a 
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”235  The 
Court identified several factors relevant to the malicious and 
sadistic inquiry, including the need for the application of force, 
the relationship between the need for force and the amount of 
force used, the extent of the injury, the threat to the safety of staff 
and prisoners, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the 
response.236 
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent in Whitley 
would have maintained a focus on objective indicia to determine 
whether a particular punishment (i.e., incarceration) has been 
rendered cruel and unusual by internal prison conditions.237  To 
the dissenting justices, the correct Eighth Amendment standard to 
apply in a case of excessive force would have been “the 
‘unnecessary and wanton’ standard,”238 the application of which 
would require consideration of the “circumstances of the 
plaintiff’s injury, including whether it was inflicted during an 
attempt to quell a riot and whether there was a reasonable 
 
234. This may not be the exact same analytical problem identified in this Article’s 
discussion of Rhodes (and subsequent conditions cases).  See supra Section II.A.  In general, 
the problem with the Eighth Amendment doctrine is that it has developed an unnecessary 
focus on intent because it has been focused (erroneously) on whether the conditions being 
challenged are punishment rather than whether the incarceration (i.e., the punishment) is 
cruel and unusual because of certain conditions.  See id.  But it may be in cases of excessive 
force that the punishment inquiry is not wrong because the force is not necessarily attendant 
to the punishment (incarceration), whereas with conditions challenges, the conditions are 
attendant to the incarceration.  So, in excessive force cases, there may be a necessary inquiry 
into the intent of the force, and there is a need to draw on how the Court defines punishment 
in cases like Ingraham and Bell v. Wolfish.  See generally Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651; Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).  This could also require an inquiry into whether the doctrine 
should be different when the challenge involves “conduct” of a prison official rather than 
mere “conditions” within a prison.  See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 ( stating that “[t]o be cruel 
and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve 
more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety”).  This inquiry, 
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.  
235. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d 
Cir. 1973)).  
236. Id. at 321.  
237. Id. at 329, 334 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
238. Id. at 329. 
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apprehension of danger[.]”239  While the dissent did not fully 
articulate how the “‘unnecessary and wanton’ standard” would 
apply beyond the facts at issue in Whitley, it is clear that the focus 
of the inquiry for those justices would be the totality of the 
objective circumstances and not the subjective intent of prison 
official defendants.240 
The 1991 decision in Wilson v. Seiter brought to a head the 
question of whether an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison 
conditions required a subjective showing as to the intent of prison 
officials.241  The case involved a challenge lodged by Pearly L. 
Wilson, a man incarcerated by the State of Ohio at the Hocking 
Correctional Facility (HCF) in Nelsonville, Ohio.242  Mr. Wilson 
challenged HCF’s “overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient 
locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper 
ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining 
facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and 
physically ill [prisoners].”243  The question presented involved 
whether Mr. Wilson had to demonstrate “a culpable state of mind 
on the part of prison officials, and, if so, what state of mind [wa]s 
required” in order to prove his Eighth Amendment claims.244 
In a five to four  decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court 
held that Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley “mandate inquiry into a 
prison official’s state of mind when it is claimed that the official 
has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.”245  To support its 
conclusion, the majority highlighted that the Eighth Amendment 
“bans only cruel and unusual punishment.  If the pain inflicted is 
not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the 
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the 
 
239. See id. at 329. 
240. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 329.   
241. See 501 U.S. 294, 296, 300 (1991). 
242. Id. at 296. 
243. Id.  
244. Id.  
245. Id. at 298-99. 
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inflicting officer before it can qualify.”246, 247  To the majority, 
then, the conditions attendant to incarceration could only be 
challenged under the Eighth Amendment if they amounted to 
punishment above and beyond the punishment of incarceration 
itself.248  
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, concurred only in the judgment249 and criticized the 
majority’s understanding of the punishment at issue in prison 
conditions cases.250  Justice White first pointed to the Hutto 
Court’s acknowledgment “that the conditions of confinement are 
part of the punishment that is subject to Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny.”251  The concurrence then drew on the Court’s analysis 
in Rhodes to conclude that  
Rhodes makes it crystal clear, therefore, that Eighth 
Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement are to 
be treated like Eighth Amendment challenges to punishment 
that is “formally meted out as punishment by the statute or 
the sentencing judge,” . . . we examine only the objective 
severity, not the subjective intent of government officials.252 
 
246. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300.  The Court made this point as support for its disregard 
of an argument put forth by Mr. Wilson and the United States as amicus curiae that suggested 
conditions claims could be distinguished into two categories:  (1) “‘short-term’ or ‘one-time’ 
conditions (in which a state-of-mind requirement would apply)” and (2) “‘continuing’ or 
‘systemic’ conditions (where official state of mind would be irrelevant).”  Id.  The Court saw 
no logical or practical use in such a distinction but recognized that “[t]he long duration of a 
cruel prison condition may make it easier to establish knowledge and hence some form of 
intent.”  Id.  
247. The Wilson Court also clarified that prisoners could not lodge challenges to 
something “so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’” unless those conditions create a “specific 
deprivation of a single human need.”  Id. at 305.  Thus:  
[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment 
violation “in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when 
they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, 
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a 
low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets. 
Id. at 304. 
248. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99.  
249. The majority vacated the decision of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case for 
reconsideration.  Id. at 306.  The Sixth Circuit had previously affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment to prison officials, concluding that Mr. Wilson had to meet 
Whitley’s obduracy and wantonness requirement.  Id. at 296. 
250. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). 
251. Id. at 307.  
252. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 309 (White, J., concurring). 
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In addition to criticizing the departure from precedent 
inherent in the majority’s adoption of an intent requirement, the 
concurrence predicted (rightly) that intent may be impossible to 
prove in many prison conditions cases,253 in part because of the 
institutional indifference outlined in Part I.254  
Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of 
cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials 
inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period of 
time.  In those circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent 
should be examined, and the majority offers no real guidance 
on this issue.  In truth, intent simply is not very meaningful 
when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a 
prison system . . . .  [H]aving chosen [] imprisonment as a 
form of punishment, a State must ensure that the conditions 
in its prisons comport with the “contemporary standards of 
decency” required by the Eighth Amendment.255 
Citing to the United States’ brief as amicus curiae, Justice 
White cautioned that inhumane prison conditions would be 
insulated from judicial review because of the majority’s 
requirement that the prisoner-plaintiffs engage in “an unnecessary 
and meaningless search for ‘deliberate indifference.’”256  
Notably, neither the majority nor concurrence defined what is 
meant by deliberate indifference, instead leaving that question for 
another day.257 
In the term following Wilson, the Supreme Court heard 
another Eighth Amendment case; this one focused on the inquiry 
 
253. Id. at 310.  
254. See generally supra Part I. 
255. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310-11 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago City Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989)). 
256. Id. at 311.  The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that “[s]eriously 
inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be insulated from constitutional challenge 
because the officials managing the institution have exhibited a conscientious concern for 
ameliorating its problems, and have made efforts (albeit unsuccessful) to that end.”  Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991) 
(No. 89-7376).  A relic of another era, the United States’ position in Wilson stands in stark 
contrast to the position taken by the Solicitor General in the COVID-19 cases.  See 
Application for a Stay of the Injunction Issued by the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio and for an Administrative Stay at 32, William v. Wilson, 455 F. 
Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio 2020), vacated 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).   
257. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 294, 297, 302, 303, 305, 306, 311. 
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relevant to a claim of excessive force.258  In Hudson v. McMillian, 
Keith Hudson alleged that three officers at the Louisiana State 
Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, used excessive force on him 
during the early morning hours of October 30, 1983.259  Mr. 
Hudson claimed that one officer punched him in the mouth, eyes, 
chest, and stomach while the second officer held him in place and 
the third officer, a supervisor, looked on, telling the first two 
officers “not to have too much fun.”260  As a result of the beating, 
Mr. Hudson “suffered minor bruises and swelling of his face, 
mouth, and lip,” and he had loosened teeth and a cracked dental 
plate.261  The district court found the three officers violated Mr. 
Hudson’s rights and awarded him $800 in damages.262  The Fifth 
Circuit reversed, holding that Mr. Hudson “could not prevail on 
his Eighth Amendment claim because his injuries were ‘minor’ 
and required no medical attention.”263  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.264 
The Hudson Court announced three important rules in 
support of reversal.  First, the Court made clear that the standard 
articulated in Whitley—”whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm”—applies in all prison excessive forces 
cases.265  Second, the Court determined that because 
contemporary standards of decency are violated whenever “prison 
officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,” a 
prisoner can bring an excessive force claim, whether or not he 
suffered significant injury.266  Third, the Eighth Amendment does 
not protect de minimis uses of physical force, so long as the “force 
is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”267 
Notably, in announcing these rules, the Court declined to 
consider the prison officials’ argument that “their conduct [could] 
 
258. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). 
259. Id.  
260. Id. 
261. Id.  
262. Id.  
263. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5. 
264. Id. at 5, 12. 
265. Id. at 6-7. 
266. Id. at 9. 
267. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). 
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not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation because it was 
‘isolated and unauthorized.’”268  In other words, the Court refused 
to consider whether rogue acts of prison officials fall outside the 
purview of the Eighth Amendment because such acts cannot fall 
within “the scope of ‘punishment’ prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment.”269  This refusal is inconsistent with the Court’s 
singular focus on what constitutes punishment in Wilson.270 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, penned a dissent in 
Hudson focused on the majority’s “expansion of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause beyond all bounds of history and 
precedent.”271  Once again harkening back to the perceived 
distinction between punishment meted out by statute or judge 
versus punishment attendant to incarceration, Justice Thomas 
reminded us that the Eighth Amendment traditionally did not 
apply “generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner 
during incarceration.”272  Therefore, because the Eighth 
Amendment only applies to “that narrow class of deprivations 
involving ‘serious’ injury inflicted by prison officials acting with 
a culpable state of mind,” Justice Thomas would hold that a use 
of force that causes only insignificant harm does not amount to 
cruel and unusual punishment.273  In Justice Thomas’s view, then, 
“our society . . . has no expectation that prisoners will have 
‘unqualified’ freedom from force, since forcibly keeping 
prisoners in detention is what prisons are all about.”274  Therefore, 
the Hudson dissent points to the inconsistency in Eighth 
Amendment doctrine that requires a showing of seriousness of 
harm in medical care cases but not in excessive force cases.275  
In the Court’s next term, it heard the Helling v. McKinney 
case, which involved a Nevada prisoner’s claim that prison 
officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by 
housing him with another prisoner who smoked.276  Mr. 
 
268. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 11-12. 
269. Id.  
270. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991). 
271. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
272. Id. at 18. 
273. Id. at 18, 20. 
274. Id. at 26. 
275. Id. 
276. 509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993). 
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McKinney, the Nevada prisoner, reached trial on two issues:  “(1) 
whether [he] had a constitutional right to be housed in a smoke-
free environment, and (2) whether [the prison officials] were 
deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical needs.”277  At 
trial, the district court granted the prison officials’ motion for a 
directed verdict, concluding that Mr. McKinney had no 
constitutional right to be housed in a smoke free environment and 
that he had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
“medical problems that were traceable to cigarette smoke or 
deliberate indifference to them.”278  The Ninth Circuit reversed 
the decision of the district court, holding that the court “erred by 
directing a verdict without permitting [Mr. McKinney] to prove 
that his exposure to [cigarette smoke] was sufficient to constitute 
an unreasonable danger to his future health.”279  The prison 
officials sought Supreme Court review of this decision, but, in the 
interim, the Court decided Wilson and, therefore, remanded the 
case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Wilson.280  
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Wilson added a subjective 
element to Mr. McKinney’s claim, but it did not otherwise change 
its prior decision, which concerned the objective component of 
the Eighth Amendment claim (i.e., whether a prisoner-plaintiff 
might be able to meet the objective component of the claim by 
demonstrating an unreasonable risk to his future health).281  The 
prison officials again sought review from the Supreme Court.282  
The Court granted certiorari and affirmed in an opinion by 
Justice White (who wrote the dissent in Wilson), holding that the 
Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated people from future 
harm.283  In reaching this holding, the Court reiterated that “the 
treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under 
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth 
Amendment.”284  Implicitly, then, the Court harkened back to the 
pre-Wilson days when it viewed conditions claims as challenging 
 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 28-9. 
279. Id. at 29. 
280. Id. at 29-30. 
281. Helling, 509 U.S. at 30. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 33. 
284. Id. at 31.  
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not the punishment of incarceration itself but whether the 
conditions at issue rendered such punishment unconstitutional.285 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented once 
again.286  This time Justice Thomas strongly intimated that he 
would overturn Estelle if presented the opportunity, and he 
reiterated and expanded upon his belief that prison conditions are 
not and cannot be punishment protected by the Eighth 
Amendment.287  He criticized the Court’s prior decisions, 
beginning with Estelle, for never examining whether the Eighth 
Amendment’s text and purpose supported the conclusion that the 
amendment’s protections should protect against prison 
deprivations.288  To Justice Thomas, “the text and history of the 
Eighth Amendment, together with the decisions interpreting it, 
support the view that judges or juries—but not jailers—impose 
‘punishment.’”289  Therefore, the entirety of the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence with regard to prison conditions 
claims should be overturned.290 
The final case that forms the Supreme Court’s doctrine 
around Eighth Amendment claims challenging prison conditions 
is Farmer v. Brennan.291  Farmer reached the Court in 1994 and 
involved a challenge to prison conditions brought by Dee Farmer, 
a transgender woman living in men’s prisons operated by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).292  Ms. Farmer sued the BOP 
and several individual prison officials after being brutally raped 
and assaulted in the spring of 1989.293  In her complaint, Ms. 
Farmer alleged that the prison official defendants transferred her 
to a high security penitentiary “or placed [her] in its general 
population despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent 
environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite 
knowledge that petitioner, as a [transgender woman] who 
‘projects feminine characteristics,’ would be particularly 
 
285. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25. 
286. Helling, 509 U.S. at 37-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
287. Id. at 40, 42. 
288. Id. at 42. 
289. Id. at 40. 
290. Id. at 40-42. 
291. 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 
292. Id. at 829. 
293. Id. at 830. 
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vulnerable to sexual attack by” other people incarcerated in the 
penitentiary.294  Ms. Farmer claimed that these allegations 
demonstrated deliberate indifference to her safety and therefore 
stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment.295 
After the district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, finding that Ms. Farmer needed to show they had 
“actual knowledge” of a potential danger, and the Seventh Circuit 
summarily affirmed without opinion, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to finally define the test for deliberate indifference.296  
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, first reiterated that Eighth 
Amendment prison conditions cases require a showing that a 
prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which 
means “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”297  
The Court then went on to define the “proper test for deliberate 
indifference.”298 
After first describing how the Court used the term deliberate 
indifference in the cases described above,299 the majority opinion 
concluded that the term must mean “something more than mere 
negligence” and “something less than acts or omissions for the 
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will 
result.”300  Settling on the conclusion that deliberate indifference 
must mean something akin to recklessness, the Court ultimately 
determined that prison officials can only be held liable for 
disregarding conditions or risks of which they are subjectively 
aware.301  In reaching this conclusion, the Court again focused on 
the idea that the Eighth Amendment only “outlaws cruel and 
unusual ‘punishments.’”302  
 
294. Id. at 830-31. 
295. Id. at 831.  
296. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831-32. 
297. Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,  297, 302-03). 
298. Id. at 835. 
299. Id. at 835-36. 
300. Id at 835.  
301. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841-42. 
302. Id. at 837 (“The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual 
‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”).  
An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm 
might well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result 
society might well wish to assure compensation.  The common law reflects 
such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis.  But 
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Justice Blackmun, concurring, recognized the Court’s undue 
focus on the word punishment and reiterated that, in his view, 
“inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment even 
if no prison official has an improper, subjective state of mind.”303  
Concerned with the pervasive violence in American prisons, 
Justice Blackmun highlighted his concern that, for many 
incarcerated people, the punishment of incarceration 
“degenerates into a reign of terror unmitigated by the protection 
supposedly afforded by prison officials.”304  He then went on to 
criticize Wilson’s conclusion that “only pain that is intended by a 
state actor to be punishment is punishment.”305  Rather than 
recognize that incarceration is the punishment in prison 
conditions cases, Justice Blackmun instead focused his criticism 
on the idea that someone cannot experience punishment unless a 
state actor intends for it to be so.306  He also took issue with the 
Wilson Court’s “myopic focus on the intentions of prison 
officials,” which he saw as plainly ignoring the type of 
institutional indifference that can arise from the modern 
American system of punishment.307  Justice Stevens wrote a short, 
paragraph-long, separate concurrence reiterating his belief that 
cruel and unusual punishment does not require a specific 
subjective motivation from a prison official.308  
 
an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived 
but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be 
condemned as the infliction of punishment. 
Id. at 837-38 (citations omitted). 
303. Id. at 851 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Justice Blackmun went on to criticize the 
Court’s holding in Wilson, “to the effect that barbaric prison conditions may be beyond the 
reach of the Eighth Amendment if no prison official can be deemed individually culpable, in 
my view is insupportable in principle and is inconsistent with the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.”  Id. 
304. Farmer 511 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
305. Id. at 854.  
306. Id. at 854-55 (citation omitted) (finding the Wilson Court’s analysis 
“fundamentally misguided,” explaining that “‘[p]unishment’ does not necessarily imply a 
culpable state of mind on the part of an identifiable punisher.  A prisoner may experience 
punishment when he suffers ‘severe, rough, or disastrous treatment,’ regardless of whether 
a state actor intended the cruel treatment to chastise or deter.”). 
307. Id. at 855-56 (pointing to Ninth Circuit Judge Noonan’s observations on the 
Framers’ concern “with the cruelty that came from bureaucratic indifference to the 
conditions of confinement”) (quoting Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1544 (9th Cir. 
1993)); see also supra notes 143-489and accompanying text. 
308. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Finally, Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence, 
agreeing only in the judgment of the Farmer majority.309  
Reiterating his view that only judges and juries inflict 
punishment, Justice Thomas once again asserted that 
“[c]onditions of confinement are not punishment in any 
recognized sense of the term.”310  To him, then, Farmer presented 
an easy case:  “[b]ecause the unfortunate attack that befell 
petitioner was not part of [her] sentence, it did not constitute 
‘punishment’ under the Eighth Amendment.”311 
As in Wilson, the Farmer Court’s focus once again ignores 
that the punishment at issue in prison conditions cases is 
incarceration itself, and the only question truly being presented 
is whether or not the conditions at issue in any given case have 
evolved such that they can now be deemed cruel and unusual.312  
However, the Court’s continued failure to recognize that 
incarceration is the punishment prisoner-plaintiffs are concerned 
with in conditions cases is no surprise when viewed in light of the 
overwhelming deference it and the broader federal judiciary have 
afforded prison officials for the past half-century. 
B. Deference to Prison Officials 
While not explicitly part of the Eighth Amendment prison 
conditions test, judicial deference to prison officials permeates 
federal court decisions applying the doctrine.313  This is no doubt 
a consequence of the explicit deference that is written into the 
other doctrines governing constitutional claims brought by 
incarcerated people.314  In non-Eighth Amendment constitutional 
challenges to prison policies, the Supreme Court has gone to great 
pains to explain the complexity and intractability of the problems 
 
309. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
310. Id. at 859. 
311. Id. 
312. See Dolovich, supra note 184, at 890.  The Farmer Court also goes one to explain 
why, in its view, the “objective” deliberate indifference test developed in City of Canton v. 
Harris is inapplicable in prison conditions cases.  See Godfrey, supra note 61, at 172-74, for 
a discussion of the Farmer Court’s treatment of Harris.  
313. Glidden, supra note 184, at 1832-33 (describing how and in what frequency 
federal courts defer to the judgment of prison officials in prison conditions cases). 
314. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 140-42 (discussing the doctrine of deference 
in certain constitutional claims brought by incarcerated people). 
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confronting those who run American prisons.315  Using those 
justifications, the Court has developed a doctrine that explicitly 
accounts for its desire to largely defer to the choices made by 
prison officials in running American prisons.316 
In the context of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has 
expressly rejected a doctrine that openly incorporates deference 
into the relevant standard.317  Nonetheless, “in practice, both it 
and the lower courts often defer to prison officials in analyzing 
claims of cruel and unusual punishment.”318  Moreover, the 
deliberate indifference standard itself—even if only implicitly—
developed from a clear concern that a standard that did not require 
a showing of intent might lead to increased liability of prison 
officials and increased judicial intrusion into the operation of 
prisons.319  As the prior section outlines, the current Eighth 
Amendment doctrine places undue focus on the subjective intent 
of prison officials because of a misplaced concern of ensuring that 
conditions being challenged in prison conditions cases amounted 
to punishment.320  But this undue focus can create situations 
where ongoing harms inside prisons go uncorrected either 
because an incarcerated person cannot prove the subjective intent 
 
315. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (explaining the 
policy justifications that inform the doctrine of deference as follows:  “the problems of 
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and . . . not readily susceptible of resolution 
by decree.  Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive 
branches of government . . . .  Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal 
courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”). 
316. Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 7 (describing the Turner standard and the 
Court’s view of the need for a deferential standard); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
89-91 (1987). 
317. See Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 141 (noting that “the Court has expressly 
rejected reasonable-relationship review for Eighth Amendment claims, finding that ‘the full 
protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force [in prison].  The whole 
point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes.’  Accordingly, ‘deference 
to the findings of state prison officials in the context of the eighth amendment would reduce 
that provision to a nullity in precisely the context where it is most necessary.’”) (quoting 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005)). 
318. Id. at 141-42. 
319. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 844-45 (1994). 
320. See supra notes 299-306, 310 and accompanying text.  
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of an individual prison official or the institutional intent of the 
prison system itself.321 
The problem of uncorrected ongoing harms in prison 
conditions cases is playing out acutely in judicial responses to 
Eighth Amendment claims relating to the COVID-19 
pandemic.322  A close look at the decisions of federal courts in 
these cases reveals a judiciary concerned with maintaining its 
deference to prison officials, even in the face of ongoing harm and 
suffering.323  Take, for example, the decision of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on the 
Arkansas prison system’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
in the Cummins Unit, discussed at the beginning of this Part.324  
In that case, Judge Kristine Baker explicitly acknowledged that 
the number of infected people in Arkansas’s prisons (incarcerated 
people and staff alike) had increased during the “few weeks” the 
case had been pending prior to her decision on the plaintiffs’ 
request for a preliminary injunction.325  Despite this 
acknowledgment, and a recognition that the plaintiffs had 
presented evidence of staff not wearing masks and gloves,326 
incarcerated people not wearing masks as directed,327 a 
prohibition on alcohol-based hand sanitizer,328 a months-long 
delay in implementing guidance from the Centers for Disease 
Control on social distancing,329 the denial of care and testing of 
incarcerated people displaying COVID-19 symptoms,330 a lack of 
follow-up care for those with COVID-19,331 a lack of aid from 
prison staff who observe incarcerated people “too weak to care 
 
321. See Glidden, supra note 184, at 1833-37 (describing the problems with ongoing 
harms and institutional intent under the current Eighth Amendment conditions test); see also 
Godfrey, supra note 61, at 186 (discussing the difficulty of proving institutional intent in 
Eighth Amendment conditions cases seeking injunctive relief). 
322. See Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 142.  
323. Id. at 142 n.99 (detailing cases wherein courts explicitly deferred to prison 
officials’ judgment and response to the pandemic, despite rising infection and death rates). 
324. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
325. Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 842 (E.D. Ark. 2020). 
326. Id. at 838. 
327. Id.  
328. Id. at 839. 
329. Id. at 839-40. 
330. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 841. 
331. Id.  
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for themselves or to seek medical care,”332 and the presence of 
positive, asymptomatic staff at work,333 the court declined to 
grant the incarcerated plaintiffs preliminary relief.334  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court determined the plaintiffs could not meet 
their burden to establish deliberate indifference335 and declined to 
intrude “into the core activities of the state’s prison system.”336  
At the time Judge Baker issued her order on May 19, 2020, at 
least four incarcerated people had already died in Arkansas’s 
prisons.337  Less than a month later, seven more people had 
died.338  And while the incarcerated plaintiffs are still litigating 
their case, the death rate in Arkansas prisons has continued to rise, 
with more than fifty people now dead.339 
 
* * * 
Eighth Amendment doctrine is built to sustain judicial 
indifference to the suffering, harm, and death of the 
incarcerated.340  The doctrine ignores the Eighth Amendment’s 
textual purpose:  to prevent cruel and unusual punishments by the 
State.341  In our current criminal system, criminal courts mete out 
punishment as a sentence of incarceration, usually for a term of 
years.342  That term of years is meant to be served in self-
contained societies created by the state—i.e., prisons.343  While 
those sentences do not have to be comfortable,344 the conditions 
 
332. Id.  
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 846. 
335. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 837 (noting that “the Court concludes that plaintiffs 
have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the subjective prong of their Eighth 
Amendment claims”). 
336. Id. at 846. 
337. See generally id.; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
339. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
340. See Godfrey, supra note 61, at 157. 
341. Id. at 158-59 (discussing scholarly debate around the intent of the drafters in both 
England and the United States); see also supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing 
scholars’ acceptance that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to 
prohibit certain methods of punishment). 
342. Glossary of Federal Sentencing- Related Terms, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, (Sept. 
2021), [https://perma.cc/M6AZ-UGV5]. 
343. Id.  
344. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).  
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in which they are served cannot be inhumane nor can they 
fundamentally alter the punishment meted out by the state.345   
However, under current doctrine, inhumane prison 
conditions will be found perfectly constitutional by the federal 
courts so long as an incarcerated plaintiff is unable to prove that 
prison officials knowingly imposed those conditions despite 
knowledge of the risk of harm.346  This outcome can be seen in 
the myriad of cases around the country challenging prison 
conditions since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.  In 
those cases, plaintiffs have presented ample evidence that the self-
contained societies created by the State have become so toxic that 
they are acting as death traps, thereby transforming the state-
sanctioned punishment into an extrajudicial death sentence for 
some incarcerated people, even in prison systems where officials 
are taking steps to mitigate the risk posed by the virus.347  
Such a result should not be sustained under the Eighth 
Amendment.  But the COVID-19 pandemic has seen this result 
upheld time-and-again because Eighth Amendment doctrine 
encapsulates an inherent indifference to suffering that cannot be 
attributed to the intentions of an individual defendant.348  Even 
where prison officials are well-motivated individuals, conditions 
that pose a risk of death should be unconstitutional.  Under our 
current system, they are not because the doctrine governing 
conditions claims is inherently indifferent to the suffering of 
incarcerated people.  Thus, the doctrine creates the second strand 
of indifference that primed American prison systems for disaster 
during the COVID-19 pandemic:  judicial indifference. 
III.  SOCIETAL INDIFFERENCE: APATHY TO THE 
INCARCERATED 
The final strand of indifference that has allowed for the 
harms experienced by incarcerated people during the course of 
the COVID-19 pandemic is the general societal apathy toward 
people behind bars.  The causes of this indifference are myriad 
 
345. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 
346. Id. at 829, 834. 
347. See supra Section III.B; see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
348. See Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 837 (E.D. Ark. 2020). 
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and complex but can in part be attributed to three overlapping 
realities of the American carceral system.  First, American prisons 
are opaque institutions, and the lack of transparency of most 
American prisons means that society remains largely ignorant of 
what is going on behind bars at any given time.  Second, 
American prisons are filled with people who are generally 
marginalized by society.  Finally, the culture of fear that 
permeates the American imagination allows society to take the 
view that people behind bars “are bad guys, just getting what they 
deserve.”349 
A. A Lack of Transparency 
Mainstream American society has little understanding of 
what goes on inside American prison walls due to the prison 
system’s lack of transparency.350  While the United States 
incarcerates nearly 2.2 million people, “the indignities suffered 
each day by the human beings living in American prisons and jails 
occur largely out of sight from the general public.”351  This lack 
of transparency deprives the American public of the ability to 
critically assess whether the societal attitude of “they deserve 
what they get” actually withstands scrutiny when the public learns 
what “what they get” actually means for incarcerated individuals.  
In other words, the American public has little means to examine 
whether the punishment occurring through incarceration matches 
the imagined punishment meted out at a criminal sentencing.  For 
example, as Andrea Armstrong acutely observes: 
[i]t would be barbaric for a judge to order a person to be 
sexually violated as a consequence of a crime.  Is it any less 
barbaric if it happens incidental to lawful imprisonment?  
The same could be said for people denied medical and 
mental health care.  Serving a certain amount of time in jail 
 
349. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 1. 
350. Andrea Craig Armstrong, The Missing Link: Jail and Prison Conditions in 
Criminal Justice Reform, 80 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2019) (arguing that “[j]ail and prison 
conditions matter because they are involuntary homes for millions of people without 
meaningful public oversight, transparency, or accountability”). 
351. Godfrey, supra note 68, at 1115. 
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or prison is the intended punishment, not death or injury by 
neglect.352 
While we can of course not know how the American public 
might react if it knew of the true conditions within the nation’s 
prisons, we may never learn if prisons remain “the black boxes of 
our society.”353  
One thing we have learned, however, from the Black Lives 
Matter movement, is that when brave passersby record police 
officers and make those recordings public, people start to pay 
attention.354  “But what about places in the United States where 
people can’t have cellphone cameras and the state-sponsored 
violence against Black people is often ignored or never revealed 
to the public?  This happens in prisons all the time.”355  What is 
going on in prisons is not visible to the public in the same way 
that the tragic killings of Black and brown men has been in recent 
years, but it is equally as problematic.356  But society has granted 
itself “permission to look away from the truth” because it views 
incarcerated people as “disposable.”357   
B. The American Underclass 
The reason incarcerated people are often viewed as 
“disposable” stems from the country’s long-standing belief that 
social problems arise from individual moral failings rather than 
structural and societal problems.358  By attributing social 
problems to individual faults, American society has long turned 
to segregation and detention to remove these so-called “inferior” 
 
352. Armstrong, supra note 353, at 18. 
353. Dewan, supra note 68. 
354. Johnny Perez, As We Work to Make Black Lives Matter, Let’s Remember That 
Incarcerated Lives Matter, Too, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GN8F-
YGJK]. 
355. Id.  
356. Id.  
357. Id.  
358. Laura I. Appelman, Pandemic Eugenics: Discrimination, Disability, & Detention 
During COVID-19, 67 LOYOLA L. REV. 329, 335 (2021) (noting that “[e]ugenic theory was 
closely intertwined [in] the late nineteenth century idea that social problems, including 
insanity, dependency, poverty, and disability, were fundamentally individual and moral in 
nature.”).  
1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:43 PM 
2021 CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES 419 
 
populations from mainstream American society.359  This trend 
continues today:  it is no secret that the vast majority of people 
that we lock up in this country are poor people and people of color 
who belong to historically disadvantaged groups.360 
Class and classism matter here; this isn’t something that 
springs up out of nowhere.  We treat being poor, being from 
the inner city, being from the country as reasons to be 
ashamed even though no one controls the circumstances of 
their own birth.  We look at places that are being starved of 
resources, where being tough is a matter of survival, and then 
we say, “[i]n order to have safety, financial stability, housing 
that isn’t subpar, you have to be willing to cut away 
everything that made you,” and when some people can’t or 
won’t do that we punish them for it.  It’s assimilation, not 
acculturation, that is demanded of people who are already 
sacrificing, already making hard choices.361 
By creating this class of other—of groups of people who are 
faulted for the circumstances of their birth—American society has 
created an underclass of people who are viewed and treated as 
less valuable by society as a whole.362  Because incarcerated 
people fall squarely within this underclass, society has remained 
largely indifferent to their plight during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
To the extent the incarcerated underclass saw any reprieve 
during the pandemic, the amnesty was limited to only those who 
could be viewed as “non-violent.”  This limitation is driven by the 
 
359. Id. at 336, 108 (“From the very beginning of the United States, segregation and 
detention have been used to control those on the margins:  the poor (in almshouses, 
workhouses, and ghettos), minorities (in convict labor farms and correctional institutions), 
and those who are disabled (in cages, asylums, and hospitals).”); see also Sharon Dolovich, 
Mass Incarceration, Meet COVID-19, 11/16/20 U. CHI. LAW REV. ONLINE *4, *6-*7 (2020) 
(noting that the individualist nature of our narratives around who is deserving of punishment 
leave “us collectively unable to reckon with the [] drivers of criminal activity” and “blind us 
to the community costs of a default carceral response”).  
360. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 74, at 4 (noting that the “carceral state has 
disproportionately hurt African American men.  But it also has been targeting a rising number 
of people from other historically disadvantaged groups,” including women, Hispanics, and 
poor whites); Dolovich, supra note 363 at 5 (noting that it “is impossible to disentangle . . . 
the structural racism that has driven the glaring overincarceration of African Americans and 
other people of color and helped shape the brutality of the American carceral experience”).   
361. MIKKI KENDALL, HOOD FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE WOMEN THAT A 
MOVEMENT FORGOT 139 (2020). 
362. Appelman, supra note 358, at 331-33 (attributing our lack of care for this 
underclass during the COVID-19 pandemic to long-standing American eugenic philosophy).  
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longstanding dichotomy made between “violent” and 
“nonviolent” crime, a dubious distinction that is driven in large 
part by the American culture of fear. 
C. A Culture of Fear 
While some incarcerated people were able to secure release 
during the COVID-19 pandemic through compassionate release 
efforts, executive clemency actions, expedited parole 
proceedings, and home confinement orders, mass release efforts 
were often stymied by fear of releasing people who committed 
“violent” crimes.363  But the “violent” versus “nonviolent” 
dichotomy that characterizes much of the American criminal 
punishment system is largely misleading, and it reinforces the 
racial stereotypes upon which the criminal punishment system is 
built.  
First, the label “violent” is often applied to crimes that many 
people might not actually believe to be violent.364  For example, 
in some jurisdictions “failing a urine test repeatedly” is classified 
as a violent crime.365  Moreover, even for those individuals who 
did commit a violent crime, “data shows that most people age out 
of ‘violent crime,’” and recidivism rates for older people are 
diminishingly low.366 
Not only is the “fearmongering” rhetoric used to describe 
people accused of violent crimes unsupported by data, it can also 
be used to reinforce racial stereotypes.367  Social science research 
demonstrates that Black people are not only more likely to be 
stopped by police, but they are also more likely to be detained 
pretrial, charged with more serious crimes, and sentenced more 
 
363. April Rodriguez, We Won’t Address Our Mass Incarceration Crisis Until We 
Rethink Our Approach To “Violent Crime”, ACLU (June 15, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/4T7W-9C5W] (explaining how “many judges have dismissed release as a 
viable option for people accused or convicted of violent charges”). 
364. Eli Hager, When “Violent Offenders” Commit Nonviolent Crimes, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2019),  [https://perma.cc/3LSB-DTSJ] (explaining that “many 
of the ‘violent offenders’ in U.S. prisons are there for crimes not everyone would classify as 
violent,” including “purse snatching,” “manufacture of methamphetamines,” and “theft of 
drugs”). 
365. Rodriguez, supra note 363. 
366. Id. 
367. Id.  
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harshly than white people.368  While these disparate outcomes 
may not always “be the result of overt racism,” they often arise 
from the implicit bias of prosecutors, judges, and juries.369  “This 
means that what society chooses to prosecute as violent is heavily 
influenced by race. Standard definitions of what and who we 
consider dangerous are not natural or self-evident; they are 
made.”370 
Thus, unless and until society works to overcome the false 
dichotomy created by speaking of incarcerated people in terms of 
those who committed “violent” offenses and those who 
committed “non-violent” offenses, the culture of fear that 
surrounds “violent” crimes will prevent societal recognition of the 
humanity of all people behind bars.371  Unless and until we can 
overcome this culture and rhetoric of fear, societal indifference to 
the lives of incarcerated people will continue to flourish by 
allowing society to ignore the individualized harms being 
suffered by people behind bars.  
 
* * * 
The institutional and judicial indifference described in Parts 
I and II of this Article is allowed to perpetuate because of an 
overarching societal indifference to the harms suffered by people 
behind bars.  That societal indifference is driven in part by the 
lack of transparency inherent to prison systems.  But even as 
advocates and journalists have made strides in recent years to 
expose what is happening behind bars,372 greater transparency has 
not fully eradicated this societal indifference.  This is because 
such indifference is tied to broader cultural attitudes toward 
marginalized groups and the culture of fear created by and which 
sustains unwarranted racial stereotypes.  Until this indifference is 
addressed, the other strands of indifference that created a carceral 
 
368.  Elizabeth Hinton, LeShae Henderson, & Cindy Reed, An Unjust Burden: The 
Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the Criminal Justice System, VERA EVIDENCE 
BRIEF 1-9 (May 2018). 
369. Id. at 7.   
370. Rodriguez, supra note 363. 
371. Id. 
372. See, e.g., Nicole B. Godfrey, Suffragist Prisoners and the Importance of 
Protecting Prisoner Protests, 53 AKRON L. REV. 279, 280 n. 7 (2019) (providing examples 
of recent exposés about what is happening behind bars). 
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system ripe for widespread harm in the face of emergencies like 
the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to persist. 
CONCLUSION 
From the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, incarcerated 
people and their advocates knew that the pandemic would prove 
devastating to the incarcerated unless the prisons, the courts, and 
society took dramatic and immediate steps to depopulate the 
prisons.373  Yet, the institutional indifference of the prison 
systems themselves, the judicial indifference of the doctrine 
governing incarcerated people’s requests for emergency relief, 
and the societal indifference of the American public and its 
attitude toward the incarcerated combined to make depopulation 
efforts nearly impossible.  
In describing these three interwoven causes of the failure to 
protect incarcerated lives during the pandemic, I used the term 
indifference purposefully.  Derived from the constitutional 
doctrine meant to protect people from cruel and unusual 
incarceration (the punishment most utilized by the American 
criminal system), the word indifference holds special meaning in 
the carceral context.  Under the current state of the law, an 
incarcerated person can only gain protection from cruel and 
unusual prison conditions when they can demonstrate that the 
cause of those conditions is the deliberate indifference of prison 
officials.374  But what I’ve tried to demonstrate in the above 
discussion is that the entire carceral system is built upon and 
sustained by these three strands of indifference:  institutional, 
judicial, and societal.  And because these three strands of 
indifference are structural in nature, it can be no surprise that they 
operate to create cruel and unusual results—i.e., unnecessary 
harms—in the face of an emergency like the pandemic.  
Ultimately, the continued existence of these three strands of 
indifference—despite demonstrable evidence of the daily 
suffering occurring within our modern punishment regime—
 
373. Kaste, supra note 13; see also Stacy Weiner, Prison Should Not Be a COVID-19 
Death Sentence, AAMC (Aug. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/QLN4-DYFZ]. 
374. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994). 
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lends itself to the conclusion that they are nothing short of 
deliberate.  
While this Article has been largely diagnostic and 
descriptive in its assessment of the strands of indifference that 
combined to create the cautionary tales of American prisons, I 
plan to provide prescriptive policy and jurisprudential reforms in 
future work aimed at eliminating these strands of indifference.  
But, any reform efforts must be informed by the lessons of 
abolitionists, who have explained to us that reform efforts “must 
be a cultural intervention,”375 that the modern prison developed 
from reform efforts rooted “in the paradigmatic national power 
relations of racial chattel” and has remained “stubbornly brutal, 
violent and inhumane” through successive reform efforts,376 that 
conceptions of justice must expose hypocrisy “entrenched in 
existing legal practices,”377 and that a radical reorganization of 
American society is necessary to truly dismantle the “issues of 
systemic and structural racism [that] should have been addressed 
more than 100 years ago.”378  If we are to truly dismantle the 
strands of interwoven indifference that allowed American prisons 
to become the epicenters of the pandemic, we must take seriously 
the calls of these abolitionists and think critically about how we 
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